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JEROLD H. ISRAEL
GIDEON v. WAINWRIGHT:
THE "ART" OF OVERRULING
During the 1962 Term, the Supreme Court, on a single Monday,
announced six decisions concerned with constitutional limitations
upon state criminal procedure.' The most publicized of these,2
though probably not the most important in terms of legal theory
or practical effect, was Gideon v. Wainwright.3 In an era of con-
stantly expanding federal restrictions on state criminal processes,
4
Jerold H. Israel is Assistant Professor of Law, University of Michigan.
1 Four of the decisions dealt directly with the procedure in state criminal cases.
See Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963) (concerning the nature of the record
that must be furnished an indigent to afford him an equal opportunity to utilize
the state appellate process); Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1963) (rejecting an Indiana
law requiring a public defender's approval before an indigent defendant can obtain
a free transcript of his trial record which is a prerequisite to an appeal from a denial
of a writ of error coram nobis); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (requir-
ing the appointment of counsel to assist an indigent in prosecuting a nondiscretion-
ary appeal); and Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (requiring the appoint-
ment of counsel for indigent defendants in state noncapital criminal cases). The
other two decisions concerned federal habeas corpus for state prisoners. Fay v. Noia,
372 U.S. 391 (1963); Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
2 See, e.g., TWm 17-18 (March 29, 1963); Editorial, Washington Post, March 21,
1963, p. A-22, col. 1.
3 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
4 See Allen, The Supreme Court and State Criminal justice, 4 WAYNE L. REv. 191,
192-96 (1958); Allen, The Supreme Court, Federalism, and State Systems of Crimi-
nal justice, 8 DE PAur. L. REv. 213 (1959); Morris, The End of an Experiment in
Federalism-A Note on Mapp v. Ohio, 36 WAsm L. REv. 407 (1961).
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the holding of Gideon-that an indigent defendant in a state crimi-
nal prosecution has an unqualified right to the appointment of
counsel-was hardly startling.6 And while Gideon will obviously
have an important effect in the handful of states that still fail to
appoint counsel at the trial level,7 it has probably caused far less
alarm among prosecutors than its sister decisions that relaxed the
5 Although the Court had before it only the case of an indigent accused of a felony,
there are indications that this holding is designed to extend to "all criminal cases"
as does the Sixth Amendment. See note 337 infra. The suggestion has been made,
however, that the "petty offense" exception that the Court has found applicable
to the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial may be applied here. Kamisar, Betts v.
Brady Twenty Years Later: The Right to Counsel and Due Process Values, 61
MicH. L. Rxv. 219, 268-70 (1962). But the right to appointed counsel would seem
more analogous to other Sixth Amendment rights, such as the right of confrontation,
that surely are applicable to all criminal cases. In any event, whether Gideon is
applied to all misdemeanors or only some, it will require a major extension of the
appointment practice in the vast majority of states. See Note, 48 CALIF. L. Rmv. 501
(1960). See note 7 infra.
6 See Kamisar, note 5 supra, at 219-60; Kamisar, The Right to Counsel and the
Fourteenth Amendment: A Dialogue on "The Most Pervasive Right" of an Accused,
30 U. Cm. L. REv. 1, 2-42 (1962); cf., e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Ker
v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Alcorta
v. Texas, 355 U.S. 28 (1957). The impending overruling was so obvious that it
was predicted by computers (with only two mistakes as to the position of individual
Justices). See Lawlor, What Computors Can Do: Analysis and Prediction of Judicial
Decisions, 49 A.BAJ. 337, 343 (1963). See also Pollock, Equal Justice in Practice,
45 Mnqx. L. REv. 737 (1961); Boskey, The Right to Counsel in Appellate Proceed-
ings, 45 MlN. L. Rev. 783, 787 (1961); The Supreme Court, 1961 Term, 76 HARv.
L. REv. 54, 116 (1962); and Note, 14 W. REs. L. REv. 370 (1963).
7 See Ann Arbor News, Aug. 6, 1963, p. 18, col. 4 (4,000 Florida convicts have
petitioned for release on the basis of Gideon). Kamisar, supra note 6, at 17-20, lists
Alabama, Florida, Mississippi, and North and South Carolina as the only states in
which appointment of counsel in felony cases is neither a legal requirement nor an
"almost invariable" court practice. Of course, Gideon will affect many more states
if it is extended to misdemeanor as well as felony cases. See note 5 supra. The retro-
spective application of Gideon-which seems likely, cf. Eskridge v. Washington, 357
U.S. 214 (1958)-would also increase the decision's practical significance, although
here the impact would be substantially muted by the fact that at least thirty states
regularly appointed counsel in felony cases as far back as 1942. See Kamisar, supra
note 6, at 17. Despite both of these possibilities, twenty-two states presented an amicus
curiae brief in Gideon urging the overruling of Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
See 372 U.S. at 336. Included in this group were a few states that had only recently
adopted provisions requiring the appointment of counsel. See, e.g., Massachusetts
(1958), Colorado (1961).
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prerequisites for obtaining a federal writ of habeas corpus8 and
imposed a requirement that states also provide counsel on appeals."
What distinguished Gideon-and what attracted the attention of
the press-was that the result there reached overruled an important
prior decision of the Court.10 Betts v. Brady," decided in 1942, had
held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment did
not impose upon the states, as the Sixth Amendment imposed upon
the federal government, an absolute requirement to appoint counsel
for all indigent defendents in criminal cases. It required the states
to provide an attorney only where the particular circumstances of
a case indicated that the absence of counsel would result in a trial
lacking "fundamental fairness."'-' In Gideon, the Court explicitly
rejected the Betts rule and held that the "Sixth Amendment's [un-
qualified] guarantee of counsel for all indigent defendants" is a
"fundamental right ...made obligatory upon the States by the
Fourteenth Amendment."' 3 Gideon thus joined the ranks of a
rather select group of cases. For, despite its widespread reputation
as a Court most ready to "disregard precedent and overrule its own
earlier decisions,"' 4 the Supreme Court in fact has directly over-
ruled prior decisions on no more than a hundred occasions in over
8 See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963); see generally the authorities cited in Reitz,
Federal Habeas Corpus: Impact of an Abortive State Proceeding, 74 HAuv. L. REv.
1315 n.1, 1350 n.120 (1961).
0 Douglas v. California, 372 US. 353 (1963). Only a handful of states, if that many,
follow a practice that meets the requirements of Douglas. See People v. Brown, 55
Cal.2d 64, 69 n.1, (1960) (concurring opinion of Justice Traynor citing the various
state practices). See AssociArloN op an BAR oF T h CIry oF NEw YouR and NATIONAL
Lw.,,L Am Am DEFaNER AssocuiAoN, EQUAL JUSTIcE FOR TH AccusED 97-111 (1959).
Of course, the retrospective application of Douglas will require only that the state
grant the indigent a new appeal, not a new trial as in Gideon.
loIn Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963), the Court also overruled a prior decision
but not one nearly so renowned.
11316 U.S. 455 (1942). 12 Id. at 473. 13 372 U.S. at 340, 342.
14 Bernhardt, Supreme Court Reversals on Constitutional Issues, 34 CoRaNu. L.Q.
55 (1948). See also AUMac, GARRusoN, Husr & MEazas, TIM LrAL PRocEss 172
(1961); Catlett, Development of the Doctrine of Stare Decisis and the Extent to
Which It Should Be Applied, 21 WAsa. L. REv. 158, 163 (1946); Jackson, The Task
of Maintaining Our Liberties: The Role of the Judiciary, 39 A.B.AJ. 961, 962 (1953);
103 CONG. Rrc. 2935 (1957).
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a century and a half of judicial review.' 5 And only about half of
these instances involved cases, like Gideon, in which the Court was
dealing with a constitutional question.16
Gideon v. Wainwright, moreover, is unique even among this
small group of "constitutional" overruling decisions. Division
among the Justices has not been uncommon in such cases, but the
1- "Direct overruling," as used here, refers only to these instances where (1) the
Court's opinion has expressly overruled a prior decision, or (2) subsequent opinions
have expressly recognized that the particular decision overruled a prior case, or
(3) the occasional case in which the Court has made no effort effectively to dis-
tinguish a prior decision and commentators have universally recognized the case
as overruling that decision. E.g., Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954),
overruling Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). A case is not considered directly
overruled where its applicability has been sharply limited by subsequent "distin-
guishing" decisions. See, e.g., Nelson v. County of Los Angeles, 362 U.S. 1 (1960),
distinguishing Slochower v. Board of Education, 350 U.S. 551 (1956); and Rutkin
v. United States, 343 U.S. 130 (1952), limiting to its facts Commissioner v. Wilcox,
327 U.S. 404 (1946).
Various compilations of overruling opinions are listed in Ulmer, An Empirical
Analyses of Selected Aspects of Lawmaking of the United States Supreme Court,
8 J. Pun. L. 414 n.1 (1959). The most thorough list, that in Blaustein & Field, "Over-
ruling" Opinions in the Supreze Court, 57 MicH. L. REv. 151, 184-94 (1958), cites
eighty-one overruling decisions (excluding rehearings) in the period from 1803 to
1958. Seven cases, cited in Ulmer, supra, should, perhaps, be added to this list.
Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200 (1950); Graves v. Schmidlapp, 315 U.S. 657 (1942);
United States v. Hastings, 296 U.S. 188 (1935); Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189
(1920); Thompson v. Whitman, 18 Wall. 457 (1873), Mason v. Eldred, 6 Wall. 231
(1867); United States v. Percheman, 7 Pet. 51 (1833). In addition, there are at least
eight overruling cases decided since 1958: Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963), over-
ruling Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200 (1950); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335
(1963), overruling Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942); Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S.
726 (1963), overruling Adams v. Tanner, 244 U.S. 590 (1917); AFL-CIO v. Curry,
371 U.S. 542 (1963), overruling Montgomery Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v.
Ledbetter Erection Co., 344 U.S. 178 (1952); Smith v. Evening News Assn., 371
U.S. 195 (1962), overruling Assn. of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westing-
house Corp, 348 U.S. 437 (1955); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), overruling
Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949); James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213 (1961),
overruling Comm'r v. Wilcox, 327 U.S. 404 (1946); United States v. Raines, 362
U.S. 17 (1960), overruling United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1875), and Barney
v. City of New York, 193 U.S. 430 (1904). This makes a grand total of 96 "direct
overrulings."
16Approximately fifty-two of the overruling cases fit this category. Bernhardt,
supra note 14, at 56-59, cites twenty-nine such decisions (excluding those that either
involved rehearings or were based on non-constitutional grounds). To this group
should be added twenty-three decisions either in Blaustein & Field, supra note 15
or in note 15.
[1963
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argument in the past always has centered on whether a decision
should be overruled.1 7 In Gideon the Court divided simply over
what should be said in overturning a prior decision that every
Justice agreed should be rejected. Though Justice Black's opinion
for the Court was concurred in by six of his brethren, both Jus-
tices Clark and Harlan found it necessary to write separate opinions
concurring only in the Court's judgment. Justice Clark did not
mention the Court's opinion, but Justice Harlan's objection to that
opinion was clearly stated in the first sentence of his concurrence.
"I agree," he said, "that Betts should be overruled, but consider it
entitled to a more respectful burial than has been accorded [by the
Court]."",
This unique expression of concern over the Court's manner of
overruling a past decision raises some basic questions concerning
judicial craftsmanship in overruling opinions. What special func-
tions, if any, should the Court seek to accomplish with an over-
ruling opinion? What techniques of opinion writing have been
used in the past to fulfill these functions? Did the majority opinion
in Gideon fail to perform the proper function of an overruling
opinion? Would it have done so by giving Betts a "more respectful
burial"? These are, of course, questions concerning method, not
result. Admittedly, as Dean Rostow recently pointed out in answer-
ing current criticisms of the Court's craftsmanship, "opinion writ-
ing is only one phase of the judicial craft.., not the whole of it
nor even its most important feature."1 9 Yet, as even the Dean ac-
knowledged, opinion writing remains a "vital phase" of the judicial
process.2 0 It is, moreover, a phase which, if the frequency of sepa-
rate opinions are any indication, causes great concern within the
Court itself.
I. THE "ART" OF OVERRULING
A. THE TASK OF THE OVERRULING OPINION
The Supreme Court long has recognized that the doctrine of
stare decisis has only "a limited application in the field of constitu-
17 The Court has been divided in approximately one-half of the "constitutional"
overruling decisions. See Blaustein & Field, supra note 15, at 184-94; Bernhardt,
supra note 14, at 56-59.
18 372 US. at 349. 19 RosTow, Tim SovmnGin PaaaoGA=nv 36 (1962).
20 Ibid. See also L1Ewnram , Tim CommLor LAw TvanrrioN 288-309 (1960).
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tional law."'21 The classic explanation of this position was presented
by Justice Brandeis in one of his oft-quoted dissents:
22
Stare decisis is usually the wise policy, because in most mat-
ters it is more important that the applicable rule of law be
settled than that it be settled right.... This is commonly true
even where the error is a matter of serious concern, provided
correction can be had by legislation. But in cases involving
the Federal Constitution, where correction through legislative
action is practically impossible, this Court has often overruled
its earlier decisions.
Although persuasive, this explanation speaks only to part of the
problem that the Court encounters in overruling constitutional de-
cisions. For the very factor that Brandeis advances to justify aban-
doning constitutional precedents-the impracticality of "correction
through legislative action"-creates certain difficulties of its own,
that make the task of overruling a particularly delicate one.
In a nation that prides itself on being a democracy, the absence
of any practical legislative process for correcting the Court's con-
stitutional decisions always presents a potential barrier to the
complete acceptance of judicial review.23 To overcome this ob-
stacle, the Court must operate within a framework that maintains
2 1 St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38, 94 (1936) (concurring
opinion of Justices Cardozo and Stone). See also Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S.
530, 543 (1962); Passenger Cases, 7 How. 282, 470 (1849) (dissenting opinion of Chief
Justice Taney); Jackson, supra note 14, at 693. Some commentators have suggested
that the principles of stare decisis should not be given any consideration in consti-
tutional adjudication. See Boudin, The Problem of Stare Decisis in Our Constitu-
tional Theory, 8 N.Y.U.L.Q. 589, 601-02 (1931); cf. Chamberlin, Doctrine of Stare
Decisis as Applied to Decisions of Constitutional Questions, 3 HIAv. L. Rav. 125
(1890).
22 Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406-07 (1932). In referring
to the practical impossibility of correction through legislative action, Brandeis noted
that on only two occasions had "the process of constitutional amendment been
successfully resorted to, to nullify decisions of this Court." Moreover, even there,
it had taken eighteen years to procure one of the amendments. Id. at 409 n.s. See
also Commissioner v. Estate of Church, 335 U.S. 632, 677 (1949) (dissenting opinion
of Justice Frankfurter). But cf. Shapiro, Judicial Modesty, Political Reality, and
Preferred Position, 47 CoRNm L. Q. 175, 193 (1962).
23 See BicK, THE LEAS DANGERoUs BRANCH 16-23 (1962); Dahl, Decision-making
in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker, 6 J. PuB. L. 279,
283 (1957). Of course, whether the judicial review is actually characterized as a
"democratic institution" will depend to a large degree upon one's definition of de-
mocracy. Compare Rosrow, supra note 19, at 117-21, 148-56, with Dahl, supra, at 6.
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its image as a disinterested decision-maker applying those funda-
mental values reflected in the Constitution 4 _A general willingness
to adhere to precedent has always been an important aspect of this
framework. Certainly, the Court could not have maintained its
role as the interpreter of a document that symbolizes continuity if
its decisions had, as Justice Jackson once claimed, "a mortality
rate almost as high as their authors. ' 25 Decisions can hardly gain
acceptance as based upon the enduring principles of the Constitu-
tion without the prospect that they will live an "indefinite while,"
at least beyond the life expectancy of the Justices deciding them. 6
So too, the view of the Court as an impersonal adjudicator has
depended to some degree on the assumption that the judge, unlike
the legislator, is sharply restricted in relying upon his personal
predilections by the necessity of following the decisions of his
predecessors.
2 7
The importance of stare decisis in promoting an acceptable image
of judicial review thus imposes a special burden upon the Court
in overruling its prior decision. On one hand, constitutional law,
even more than other areas of the law, must be subject to judicial
change.28 And while this often can be achieved by distinguishing
or even ignoring inconsistent precedents, there are times when
intellectual honesty and proper application of the new rule by the
24See McCloskey, Foreword, The Reapportionment Case, 76 HAv. L. Ray. 54,67
(1962); Bickel, supra note 23, at 23-29. This, of course, attempts to justify judicial
review, not as a majoritarian institution, but rather as an institution performing
an essential governmental function which other institutions cannot perform. Cf.
HART & WhcusLER, THE FrEnAL Cotras ANDi Tm FEDmL SYSTEM 92-93 (1953).
2 5 Jackson, The Task of Maintaining Our Liberties: The Role of The Judiciary,
39 A.B.AJ. 961, 962 (1953). In one sense Jackson was accurate. There have been
fewer Justices than there have been opinions overruled. See also Douglas, Stare
Decisis, 49 CoLuM. L. REv. 735, 736 (1949). For a discussion of the symbolism of the
Constitution, see GAasmr, Tim CouRsE oF AMERCAN DamvocRarlc THOUGHT 396-407
(1940); Bickel, note 23 supra, at 29-31.
28See Henkin, Some Reflections on Current Constitutional Controversy, 109
U. PA. L. REv. 637, 660 (1961).
27 See WAssaaSnI om, THE JuwIctAL DmclsION 75-79 (1961); cf. Henlin, note 26
supra, at 656.
28See Fa auiN, TbE SUPREME CoURT OF THE Uurrm STATES 26 (1961); Ly-, AN
INTroDucrioN To LEGAL REAsoNING 41-44 (1949).
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lower courts require that a prior decision be directly overruled.2 9
On the other hand, the overruling decision represents a source of
danger to both professional and popular acceptance of the Court
as the disinterested interpreter of the Constitution. Even where the
end result in a particular case meets with general approval, the
rejection of stare decisis may well raise doubts both as to the
Court's impersonality and as to the principled foundations of its
decisions, as evidenced by their lack of "staying power."30 The
overruling decision generally will tend to emphasize the subjective
elements in judicial review by focusing attention on the back-
ground and personal philosophies of the various justices. This is
especially true when the change in the law has occurred over a
comparatively short period of time marked by a significant altera-
tion in the Court's personnel.31 Of course, not every overruling
decision will have this effect. And even those that do will not cause
the Court to lose overnight the "public faith in its objectivity and
detachment" that is the ultimate basis of its authority.32 Neverthe-
less, some danger is inherent in almost every overruling decision,
and each case that does emphasize the personal and temporary
29 See generally Traynor, Comment on Courts and Lawmaking, in LEGA INsiz-
TrnoNs ToDAY Am ToMoRuow 48, 54-55 (Paulsen ed. 1959); LLEwELLYN, THE
COMMON LAW TRAuroioN 257 (1960). In many instances, the Court has been forced
to overrule cases explicitly because lower courts had refused to recognize that the
case had lost all its vitality. See, e.g., California v. Thompson, 313 US. 109 (1941);
and Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 US. 236 (1941). The technique of direct overruling
may also be preferred because it generally insures that a "dead" case will stay buried.
Cf. Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525, 562, 564, 570 (1923) (dissenting
opinions of Chief Justice Taft and Justice Holmes commenting upon the revival
of Lochner v. New York).
30 See HART & SAcHs, THE LEG.L PRocEss 612, 613 (mimeo. 1958); The Legal
Tender Cases, 12 Wall. 457 (1870); Boudin, supra note 21, at 613-15; note 93 infra.
3 l Approximately three-quarters of all overruling cases have reversed cases decided
within the previous twenty-five years, Bernhardt, supra note 14, at 56-59, and have
occurred within a five-year period after significant changes (3 to 6 Justices) in the
Court's composition. Ulmer, supra note 15 at 434. See also Kadish, judicial Resiew
in the United States Supreme Court and the High Court of Australia, 37 TXAs
L. REv. 133, 154-55. Douglas, supra note 25, at 736.
3 2 Kurland, The Supreme Court and Its judicial Critics, 6 UTAH L. REv. 457, 466
(1959). In this regard, it is the confidence of the bar that is particularly important.
See Shapiro, The Supreme Court and Constitutional Adjudication of Politics and
Neutral Principles, 31 Gzo. WAsH. L. REv. 587, 605 (1963). Yet it is the bar that
most frequently has been critical of departures from precedent.
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quality of a judicial rule further tarnishes the image that is neces-
sary to maintain judicial review in a democracy.
Although only occasional opinions by individual Justices have
expressly recognized this special problem of the overruling case,33
an examination of the opinions for the Court in these cases suggests
that it has not been overlooked. The Court over the years has
employed certain "techniques" in overruling opinions that, as a
general pattern, tend to preserve the impersonal qualities of the
judicial process by emphasizing factors other than the vicissitudes
of changing personnel.
B. THE TECHNIQUES OF OVERRULING
1. Changing conditions.-Even those Justices most opposed to
overruling constitutional decisions have acknowledged that the
"law may grow to meet changing conditions" and that the doc-
trine of stare decisis should not require a "slavish adherence to au-
thority where new conditions require new rules of conduct."34 It
is not surprising therefore that overruling opinions in several cases
have emphasized the changed circumstances brought about by the
passage of time.35 Indeed, this technique was employed in one of
the earliest overruling decisions, The Genesee Chief,8 which re-
jected a unanimous holding of the Court decided only twenty-
four years earlier in The Thomas Jefferson.3 Chief Justice Taney's
opinion for the Court in The Genesee Chief refused to follow the
prior ruling that the national admiralty jurisdiction was limited, in
accord with English common law, to waters that "ebbed and
flowed.' 38 After stressing that the "great and growing commerce"
33 See Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. 157 US. 429, 652 (1895) (dissenting
opinion); Brown v. Allen, 344 US. 443, 535 (1953) (concurring opinion of Justice
Jackson); Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 US. 466,487 (1939) (concurring
opinion of Justice Frankfurter).
34 Roberts, J., dissenting, in Mahnich v. Southern SS. Co, 321 U.S. 96, 113 (1944).
35 See, e.g, Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 493-94 (1954); Burstyn
v. Wilson, 343 US. 495, 502 n.12 (1952); Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141, 145-46
(1940); West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 399 (1937). This approach
has also been employed in non-constitutional cases. See, e.g., United States v. Perche-
man, 7 Pet. 50, 88-89 (1833).
86 12 How. 443 (1851).
37 10 Wheat. 428 (1825). 38 12 How. at 459.
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on inland waters had made the extension of admiralty jurisdiction
to non-tidewater areas a practical necessity, he noted that The
Thomas Jefferson had been decided "when the great importance
of the question as it now presents itself could not be foreseen."3' 9
The earlier decision had been rendered in 1825, "when the com-
merce on the rivers of the west and on the lakes was in its infancy,
and, of little importance, and but little regarded compared with
that of the present day." 40 Accordingly, while the Court was "sen-
sible of the great weight" to which its prior decision was entitled,
it nevertheless could rightfully overrule The Thomas Jefferson,
since the reasoning there was clearly inapplicable to the contem-
porary situation.41
Subsequent overruling opinions relying upon changed condi-
tions have emphasized new developments in areas far less prag-
matic than the commercial traffic involved in The Genesee Chief.
In Brown v. Board of Education42 for example, the Court cited
the change in the status of public schools since Plessy v. Ferguson,
as well as the present state of scientific knowledge about psycho-
logical developments of children.43 Indeed, the growth of knowl-
edge concerning various aspects of economic and social develop-
ment has been a fairly common point of emphasis in those opinions
that have rejected prior precedent on the ground that "time and
circumstances had drained [the overruled] case of vitality."
44
Reliance upon the "changed conditions" argument logically
should permit an overruling opinion both to reject a precedent
and at the same time acknowledge its correctness when originally
decided.45 The Court has never gone quite this far, however, al-
39 Id. at 453. Taney also noted that the English common law, on which The
Thomas Jefferson was based, had developed before the advent of the steamboat.
40 Id. at 456. 41 Ibid. 42 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
43 Id. at 492-94. The Court did not make a specific reference to a change in scien-
tific knowledge since Plessy, but did state that "whatever may have been the extent
of psychological knowledge at the time of Plessy v. Ferguson," the present findings
were "amply supported by modern authority."
44 Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141, 144 (1940). See also, e.g., West Coast Hotel Co.
v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 399 (1937); cf. Edwards v. California, 314 US. 160, 177
(1941).
4 5 "In refusing to follow a precedent a court must not always assert that its prede-
cessor erred. Yesterday's wise decisions were commands for yesterday, but only
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though at least one opinion intimated that the writer might have
accepted the overruled case under the circumstances applying at
the time of its decision.46 More often, the Court simply has taken
no position as to the validity of the rejected case .47 But even where
the Court does suggest that the overruled decision was incorrect,
an opinion emphasizing the changed circumstances naturally will
contain the countersuggestion that, in any event, the former Court
might well have decided differently if confronted with today's
conditions.48 Thus, with the change-in-circumstances rationale, the
Court may obtain the best of both worlds. Not only is the prior
decision overruled, but the adverse emphasis upon differences in
the Court's personnel that normally attends such action is elimi-
nated, or at least diluted, by relying upon grounds consistent with
that concept of impersonal decision-making ordinarily supported
by stare decisis.
2. The lessons of experience.-Closely related to the change-in-
circumstances rationale is the argument that a prior precedent may
be rejected when it has failed to pass the "test of experience.
49
The Court has frequently acknowledged that "the process of trial
and error, so fruitful in the physical sciences is appropriate also in
the judicial function." 50 This willingness to make adjustments in
the light of the "lesson of experience"51 has been cited as at least a
partial ground for overruling precedent on several occasions.5 2 In
instructions for today." Moore & Oglebay, The Supreme Court, Stare Decisis, and
Law of the Case, 21 Ta-x. L. REv. 514, 523 (1943).
48See Glidden Co. v. Zdanock, 370 U.S. 530, 543 (1962).
47 See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Edwards v. Cali-
fornia, 314 U.S. 160 (1941); Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141 (1940).
48 See, e.g., The Genesee Chief, 12 How. 443 (1851).
40 Barden v. Northern Pacific Railroad, 154 U.S. 288, 322 (1894).
Ca Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393,407 (1932) (dissenting opinion).
See also Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 122 (1940); Sweezy v. New Hampshire,
354 U.S. 234, 266 (1957) (concurring opinion); Green v. United States, 356 U.S.
165, 195 (1958) (dissenting opinion); Jackson, The Task of Maintaining Our Liber-
ties: The Role of the Judiciary, 39 A.B.AJ. 961, 962 (1953): ".... the years [have]
brought about a doctrine that [econstitutional] decisions must be tentative and subject
to judicial cancellation if experience fails to verify them."
51 Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 US. 393,407 (1932) (dissenting opinion).
52 See, e.g., Helvering v. Producers Corp, 303 US. 376, 384-85 (1938); Farmers
Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota, 280 U.S. 204, 209 (1930); National Ins. Co. v. Tide-
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most cases, the overruling opinion based the rejection of the earlier
decision upon the administrative difficulties and uneven results re-
vealed by its application.53 In other instances, however, experience
in the application of a rule has been used to show the erroneous
nature of the factual or policy assumption upon which it was
based. In Mapp v. Ohio.,4 for example, the Court noted that the
experience of various states had revealed the error in the supposi-
tion that remedies other than the exclusionary rule could effective-
ly deter unreasonable searches and seizures.
In relying upon the "lesson of experience," the Court has once
again tended to depreciate changes in its personnel as the cause of
the change in the law by either the outright suggestion or, at least,
the insinuation that the present result was one that its predecessors
might well have reached if they had had the same information, de-
rived from experience under the rule first promulgated. 5 This role
of the "experience" rationale may be accentuated by the reminder
that "courts are not omniscient"5 6 and that "judicial opinions must
yield to facts unforeseen."5' 7 On occasion, it may be further imple-
mented by the conclusion that the result of applying a particular
doctrine has been exactly the opposite of that intended by the ear-
lier Court and that the achievement of this original objective can
in fact be accomplished only through reversal of the original deci-
water Co., 337 US. 582, 618 (1949) (concurring opinion of Justice Rutledge); and
Washington v. W. C. Dawson & Co, 264 US. 219, 237 (1924) (dissenting opinion
of Justice Brandeis). Cf. Helvering v. Halock, 309 US. 106, 110 (1940) (overruling
on non-constitutional grounds). See also Douglas, Stare Decisis, 49 COLUM. L. REv.
735, 747 (1949); and Green, Stare Decisis and the Supreme Court of the United
States, 4 NAT'L B.J. 191, 201 (1946), discussing United States v. Darby, 312 US. 100
(1941), which overruled Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 US. 251 (1918).
53 See, e.g., Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 US. 64, 74 (1938); Farmers Loan & Trust
Co. v. Minnesota, 280 US. 204, 209 (1930); Helvering v. Producers Corp., 303 US.
376, 384-85 (1938). See also the non-constitutional overrulings in New England R.R.
v. Conroy, 175 US. 323, 341 (1899); Helvering v. Hallock, 309 US. 106, 110 (1940).
54 367 U.S. 643, 651-52, (1961), overruling Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949);
cf. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 US. 64, 74 (1938).
55 See Washington v. W. C. Dawson & Co, 264 U.S. 219, 237 (1924) (dissenting
opinion of Justice Brandeis).
56 Green v. United States, 356 US. 165, 195 (1958) (dissenting opinion).
57 Jaybird Mining Co. v. Weir, 271 US. 609, 619 (1926) (Justice Brandeis dis-
senting).
[1965
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sion itself.5s Of course, reliance upon difficulties experienced in the
application of the overruled case will lose much of its effectiveness
in de-emphasizing shifts in the Court's composition when such dif-
ficulties were readily foreseeable at the time the problem was first
decided. Yet, even here, there remains the remote possibility that
problems that may not have seemed very serious when contem-
plated in the abstract might well have caused a reversal of position
when faced as a matter of practical reality.
3. The requirements of later precedent.-In the majority of over-
rulings, the opinions have been based upon neither changing con-
ditions nor the lessons of experience. They have relied simply upon
the "error" of the earlier decision. 9 Only a small number of these
opinions, however, have relied solely upon the force of reasoning
now considered superior to the rationale of the overruled case.°0
The Court generally has attempted to buttress its position by show-
ing that the rejection of the overruled case was required, or at least
suggested, by other, later decisions basically inconsistent with its
earlier ruling."' Examples of the use of this technique in overruling
opinions are extremely varied. While most of the "inconsistent
precedent" has been found in cases dealing with the same problem
as the overruled decision, the Court occasionally has relied upon
rulings in related areas that, while not directly questioning the
overruled case, could be treated as having "impaired its author-
ity."062 In Mapp v. Ohio, for example, the majority opinion pointed
to the basic inconsistency between the Court's refusal to exclude
unconstitutionally seized evidence and the required exclusion of\
58 See Fay v. Noia, 372 US. 391, 437 (1963) (non-constitutional overruling).
50 See, e.g., United Stater v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 25-26 (1960); State Tax Comm'n
v. Aldrich, 316 U.S. 174 (1942); West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 397
(1937).
0 The Court has based its decision solely on the ground that the overruled
case was wrong in only about a half-dozen cases. See United States v. Rabinowitz,
339 U.S. 56, 64-66 (1950); Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943);
Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 93 (1940); O'Malley v. Woodrough, 307 U.S. 277,
281 (1939); Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 131 (1932); The Legal Tender
Cases, 12 Wall. 457 (1870).
01 See, e.g., cases cited note 59 supra.
02 Gore v. United States, 357 US. 386, 388 (1958). See Smith v. Allwright, 321
US. 649, 659-62 (1944); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961).
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all coerced confessions, irrespective of their reliability. 3 Similarly,
in Smith v. A11vright, 4 the Court found that its decision in United
States v. Classic0 5 holding that a party primary could be an integral
part of the election machinery subject to congressional regulation
under Article I, §4 "call[ed] for a re-examination" of its holding
in Grovey v. Townsend"' that the action of a political party con-
vention in excluding Negroes from a primary election did not
constitute state action.
Overruling opinions also have differed in their treatment of the
inconsistency between the earlier ruling and the later precedent.
In some cases the Court has acknowledged that the decisions could
be reconciled, but found it necessary to overrule the earlier de-
cision because the basis of distinction between the cases was not
justifiable in terms of the function of the legal principle involved.08
More often, the Court has maintained, sometimes in the face of
obvious distinctions, 69 that it has no choice but to overrule the
earlier decision, since that ruling is totally irreconcilable with sub-
sequent cases.70 A variation of this approach has been employed
in those opinions overruling a principle that had been sharply
limited by a long series of cases creating numerous exceptions to
its application.71 In such instances, the overruling opinions, after
noting that the later decisions already had "stricken the founda-
tion" from the original case,72 have asserted the result as merely "a
63 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
64 321 U.S. 649 (1944). 66 295 U.S. 45 (1935).
65 313 U.S. 299 (1941). 67 321 U.S. at 661.
68 See, e.g., State Tax Comm'n v. Aldrich, 316 U.S. 174, 179 (1942); Sherrer
v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 353 (1948); Helvering v. Mountain Producers Corp., 303
U.S. 376, 383 (1940).
69 See, e.g., United States v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R.R., 312 U.S. 592 (1941);
California v. Thompson, 313 U.S. 109 (1941).
70 See, e.g., the cases cited note 69 supra; Graves v. Schmidlapp, 315 U.S. 657, 665
(1942); West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 398 (1937).
71 See, e.g., Graves v. Schmidlapp, 315 U.S. 657 (1942); Graves v. N.Y. ex rel.
O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466 (1939); Pennsylvania R.R. v. Towers, 245 U.S. 6 (1917). See
also Gordon v. Ogden, 3 Pet. 33 (1830).
72 Oldahoma Tax Comm'n v. Texas Co., 336 U.S. 342, 352 (1949).
E1963
HeinOnline  -- 1963 Sup. Ct. Rev. 224 1963
GIDEON V. WAINWRIGHT 225
logical culmination of a gradual process of erosion."73 On occasion,
the Court has even gone so far as to declare that its previous de-
cision already had been overruled sub silentio by the "tide" of
later cases.74
No matter which of these variations is utilized, the mere presence
of these previous decisions indicates that the Court's ruling is not
the result of a sudden shift. On the contrary, particularly where
the authority of the overruled case was gradually undermined by
a series of decisions, the Court may properly emphasize that the
downfall of the overruled case was not the product of a "little
coterie of like minded justices" recently appointed to the bench,75
but of a long line of judges who, over the years, participated in
the various undermining decisions. 76 This quality of borrowing
support from the past also provides what is probably the primary
value of the "inconsistent precedent" rationale: a court can over-
rule a decision while purporting to follow the principles of stare
decisis. In pointing to subsequent decisions basically at odds with
the case to be overruled, the Court places itself in a position where
it must choose between two lines of authority. It must either over-
rule a precedent or "disregard a contrary philosophy expressed in
a later case."77 Moreover, where the inconsistent precedent consists
of a group of later cases showing a continuous trend away from
the original decision, the Court has suggested that it really has no
choice but to follow the path of subsequent decisions and overrule
73 Kadish, Judicial Review in the United States Supreme Court and the High
Court of Australia, 37 T x. L. REv. 133, 155 (1958).
74 See, e.g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963); Phelps Dodge Corp. v.
N.L.R.B., 313 U.S. 177, 187 (1941); Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100, 118 (1890).
75 Allen, The Supreme Court and State Criminal justice, 4 WAYNE L. Rvv. 191,
192 (1958).
76 An interesting variation of this approach was employed in Louisville R.R. v.
Letson, 2 How. 497, 555 (1844). The opinion there noted: '9By no one was the
correctness (of the overruled decisions] more questioned than by the late chief
justice who gave them. It is within the knowledge of several of us, that he re-
peatedly expressed regret that those decisions had been made... "' See also United
States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 25-26 (1960); Graves v. N.Y. ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S.
466, 480-85 (1939); In re Ayers, 123 US. 443, 487-89 (1887).
77 Blaustein & Field, "Overruling" Opinionm in thq SupreM. Cqurt. 57 Mica. L.
REV. 151, 174 (1958).
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the original case.78 As one opinion put it: "No interest which could
be served by ... rigid adherence to stare decisis is superior to the
demands of a system based on a consistent application of the
Constitution."79 In fact, carried to its limits, the argument based
upon the force of subsequent decisions has permitted the Court to
disclaim the responsibility for anything more than the formalistic
burial of a case already dead. 0
4. The place of the overruling art.-Changing conditions, lessons
of experience, and inconsistent later cases clearly have been the
basic grounds of overruling decisions. There are very few such
cases in which the Court has not employed one or the other.8' A
description of the rationale of overruling opinions would not be
complete, however, without mentioning certain other factors com-
monly emphasized by the Court. Overruling opinions, particularly
those relying upon the inconsistency of later decisions, frequently
have attempted to depreciate the precedent value of the overruled
case even as of the time it was decided.8 2 Thus, the opinions often
have noted, and sometimes stressed, that the overruled case was
decided by a divided Court. 3 Similarly, attention has been focused
on the fact that the particular context in which an issue was orig-
inally presented had prevented the Court from giving to it the
"deliberate consideration" normally afforded significant constitu-
tional issues. 4 Still another point emphasized in overruling opinions
78 See, e.g., Scherrer v. Scherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948); State Tax Comm'n v.
Aldrich, 316 U.S. 174 (1942); Graves v. Schmidlapp, 315 U.S. 657 (1942).
79 Graves v. Schmidlapp, 315 U.S. 657, 665 (1942). See also Burnet v. Coronado
Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 405 (1932) (Justice Brandeis dissenting).
80 See, e.g., Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100, 118 (1890); Olsen v. Nebrasia, 313 U.S.
236, 244 (1941); Ferguson v. Skrupa, 373 U.S. 726 (1963).
81 See note 60 supra.
82 See, e.g., East Ohio Gas Co. v. Tax Comm'n, 283 US. 465, 471-72 (1931);
California v. Thompson, 313 U.S. 109, 116 (1941); Thompson v. Whitman, 18 Wall.
457, 464 (1873); see also O'Malley v. Woodrough, 307 U.S. 277, 298 (1939) (noting
academic criticism and professional opinion in opposition to the overruled decision).
83 See, e.g., United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 115 (1941); United States v.
Chicago, M, St. P. & P. R.R., 312 U.S. 592, 578 (1941); Gordon v. Ogden, 3 Pet.
33,34 (1830).
8 4 See, e.g., Wabash, St. L. & P. Ry. Co. v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 557, 568 (1886);
Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Co, 320 U.S. 661, 668, n.1 (1944); and Graves v.
New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466, 480-85 (1939); cf. Monroe v. Pape, 365
U.S. 167, 218 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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-with two very notable exceptions8 5-has been the unavailability
of a lesser ground that would permit the Court to reach the correct
result without overruling its prior decision.86 Although these fac-
tors do not themselves furnish an independent ground for reversing
prior decisions, they may effectively supplement the primary argu-
ments based upon changed conditions, experience, or the effect of
later cases. The image of the overruling process presented in the
Court's opinion still rests, however, essentially upon the use of these
basic rationales.
In this regard it should be emphasized that while these argu-
ments obviously improve that image by minimizing the importance
of alterations in the Court's composition, they are not mere fagades
put forth as a matter of good public relations.87 Differences in
viewpoints between present and past members of the Court ob-
viously are important,88 but changed conditions, the lesson of ex-
perience, and the course of later decisions are relevant factors that
do and should have considerable bearing upon the Court's deter-
mination to overrule a prior decision."9 As the Court has frequently
recognized, the principles of stare decisis still have some applicabil-
ity in the area of constitutional law.90 There remains, at the least, a
s8 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
86 See West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 387-88 (1937); Chicago
& E. Ml1. R.R. v. Industrial Comm'n, 284 U.S. 296, 298 (1932); Williams v. North
Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 292 (1942).
8 But of. Kadish, supra note 73, at 153, suggesting that various attacks upon the
"Court's free and easy ways with stare decisis ... center principally upon the politi-
cal consideration of adverse public reaction to a too slight regard by the court for
its own pronouncements, rather than upon the integrity of the legal principle";
Douglas, Stare Decisis, 49 CoLum. L. REV. 735, 740 (1949); see also Arnold, Professor
Hart's Theology, 73 HIv. L. REv. 1298, 1310 (1960).
88 See FRANiumF, LAW AND PoLITlcs 113 (1939); and Rosrow, THE SovMIGN
PREoGATrVE 37 (1962). See also Douglas, supra note 87, at 736-37.
s9 Cf. Henkin, Some Reflections on Current Constitutional Controversy, 109
U. PA. L. REv. 637, 654-55 (1961); JAcKsoN, THE Surr'axm CouTr iN THE AMmUcAN
Sysrn 79-80 (1955).
00 See, e.g., Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 192 (1957); Di Santo v. Penn-
sylvania, 273 U.S. 34, 42 (1927) (dissenting opinion of Brandeis, J.): "It is usually
more important that a rule of law be settled, than that it be settled right.... Often
this is true although the question is a constitutional one."
Several examples of constitutional cases in which Justices voted against the po-
sition they would ordinarily have taken because of the weight of stare decisis are
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presumption of validity that attaches to the conclusions expressed
in prior opinions.91 Of course, this may be overcome by a finding
that the opposite result is clearly the correct one, but the assump-
tion that the later Court thus has obtained "a knowledge and wis-
dom ...denied to its predecessors"92 naturally carries with it a
certain uneasiness. Any doubts of this sort, however, may be sub-
stantially lessened if, in addition to the arguments supporting its
position, the Court can depreciate the views of its predecessor by
showing either that they concerned conditions far different from
those of today, that they were made without the information
gained through experience in their application, or even that they
stand against the tide of the views expressed by other courts over
the years. Thus, in relying upon these factors, the Court has merely
followed the standard policy of attempting to present the strongest
case for the result it has reached, which, in this instance, involves
showing not only the reasonableness of its own views but also the
inappropriateness of following the contrary views expressed by its
predecessor.
The basic patterns of reasoning traditionally employed in over-
ruling cases, therefore, are consistent in all respects with the proper
objectives of the judicial opinion. Of course, this is not to suggest
that these rationales are suited to every case. There have been over-
ruling decisions, like The Legal Tender Cases93 and Rabinowitz v.
United States,94 so patently based on the changes in personnel that
no explanation for the overruling other than the difference in the
cited in Reed, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Law, 35 PA. BA.Q. 131, 137 (1938).
But see Kadlish, supra note 73, at 153 n.84.
91 See cases cited supra note 90; but see Douglas, supra note 87, at 736. This is
particularly true where a ruling has been adhered to in a number of subsequent
decisions. See, e.g., Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 192 (1957); Gore v. United
States, 357 U.S. 386, 392 (1958); Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531-32 (1954); Ullman
v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 437-38 (1956); see also United States v. Rabinowitz,
339 U.S. 56, 85 (1950) (dissenting opinion); Pollock v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co,
157 U.S. 429, 630-33 (1895).
92 Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 667 (1944) (dissenting opinion); see also
Pollock v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 519-20 (argument of James
C. Carter).
93 12 Wall. 457 (1870). See Boudin, Stare Decisis in Our Constitutional Theory,
8 N.Y.U.L.Q. 588, 612 (1931).
94 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
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views of the Justices originally in the majority and their successors
could reasonably be offered.95 (It might be noted in passing that
neither of these sudden shifts in position did much to enhance the
Court's reputation among the bar,9 and The Legal Tender Cases
actually "shook popular respect for the Court."9 ) But where these
justifications for disregarding precedent are applicable, they should
be employed in the interests of both the logical persuasiveness of
the Court's position and the maintenance of the profession's confi-
dence-and through it the public's confidence-in the impersonal
and principled qualities of the judicial process. It is with this stand-
ard in mind that the Court's opinion in Gideon v. Wainwright will
be analyzed.
II. TIm OvERRUrLING TEcHmQuE OF GmoN v. WAiNWRiGHT
A. THE TWO OPINIONS
An analysis of the overruling technique employed in Gideon
must properly begin with the opinion in Betts v. Brady.98 Smith
Betts, charged with robbery in a Maryland court, had requested
the appointment of counsel to represent him. When the trial court
denied the request, Betts pleaded not guilty, waived his right to a
jury, and conducted his own defense. Found guilty and sentenced
to prison, Betts filed a habeas corpus petition with Chief Judge
Bond of the Maryland Court of Appeals alleging that the trial
judge's failure to appoint counsel violated the federal Constitution.
Judge Bond rejected this claim, and the Supreme Court, on writ
of certiorari, affirmed by a vote of six to three. The majority opin-
ion, written by Justice Roberts and concurred in by Chief Justice
Stone, and Justices Reed, Frankfurter, Byrnes, and Jackson, was
modeled to a large extent upon the opinion of Judge Bond below.99
The Court's opinion noted at the outset that since the Sixth
Amendment applied only to federal courts, Betts's rights would be
05 See also Jones v. Opelika, 319 U.S. 103 (1943). For a discussion of that case
see Kadish, supra note 73, at 154 n.97.
90 0 On The Legal Tender Cases, see 5 AM. L. REv. 366 (1870). On Rabinowi tz, see
Note, 49 Micw. L. REv. 128 (1950).
9 7 HuGsis, ThE SuPRmnm CouRT oF um UTm STATES 52 (1928).
98 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
09 Record, pp. 29-30 (opinion of Judge Bond).
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determined under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, which was "less rigid and more fluid" than the spe-
cific provisions of the Bill of Rights. 00 The question posed by
petitioner's argument accordingly was viewed as "whether due
process of law demands that in every case, whatever the circum-
stances, a State must furnish counsel to an indigent defendant."''
Justice Roberts found that this precise question had never been
"squarely adjudicated," though language in some clearly distin-
guishable opinions did "lend color" to petitioner's contentions.02
Turning to the merits of the question, he noted that the Due
Process Clause encompassed only those rights that were "funda-
mental and essential to a fair trial." Whether the absolute right to
appointed counsel fell within this category would be determined
in the light of the "common understanding of those who lived
under Anglo-American system of law."'1 3 After examining past
and present state practices in appointing counsel, Roberts found
that, in most states, the "considered judgment" of the people, their
representatives and the courts was that "appointment of counsel
[was] not a fundamental right.., essential to a fair trial" but mere-
ly a matter of "legislative policy."'1 This judgment, he noted, was
sustained by the practice in Maryland. For example, Judge Bond,
in his opinion below, had stated that his experience presiding over
more than 2,000 cases "had demonstrated . . . that there are fair
trials without counsel employed for prisoners."' 0 5 Justice Roberts
concluded that "while want of counsel in a particular case may
result in a conviction lacking in ... fundamental fairness," the
Court could not "say that the Amendment embodies an inexorable
command that no trial for any offense, or in any court, can be
fairly conducted and justice accorded a defendant who is not rep-
resented by counsel."'1 6 Due process only requires that counsel be
100 316 U.S. at 462. 101 Id. at 464; see also id. at 462.
102 Id. at 462-63. 103 Id. at 464, 465. 104 Id. at 471.
105 Id. at 472 n.3 1. This statement was cited to supplement the Court's argument,
also advanced by Judge Bond below, that non-jury trials in Maryland were con-
ducted on a more informal basis and the trial judge was "in a better position to see
impartial justice done than when the formalities of a jury trial are involved." Id. at
472.
106 Id. at 473. The Court also stressed that acceptance of such a position would
require appointment of counsel in all types of cases, including small crimes tried
[1963
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provided where the special circumstances of the individual case
indicate that the absence of legal representation would deprive the
defendant of a fair trial. Justice Roberts found no evidence that
the case before him fell within this category. His opinion empha-
sized that Betts had had a non-jury trial, which left the judge more
leeway to "see impartial justice done," and that the case had pre-
sented only the "simple issue" of veracity of conflicting testimony
that an adult with Betts's background could adequately handle
himself.10
7
Justice Black wrote a dissenting opinion in Betts that was joined
by Justices Murphy and Douglas. He argued that the Fourteenth
Amendment automatically made the Sixth Amendment "applicable
to the States,'10 but that the right to appointment of counsel was
constitutionally protected even under the majority's view of the
Due Process Clause, since it was a "fundamental right." In support
of this conclusion the dissent quoted from various cases recognizing
the importance of counsel, including Justice Sutherland's opinion
for the Court in Powell v. Alabama.09 Justice Black also empha-
sized that most of the states, thirty-five by his count, had recog-
nized the fundamental nature of the right to counsel by "constitu-
tional provisions, statutes, or established practice judicially ap-
proved, which assure that no man shall be deprived of counsel
merely because of his poverty. '" 0 The dissent also mentioned that
Betts was "a farm hand.., out of a job and on relief," and that he
had "little education," but no attempt was made to cite specific in-
stances at the trial where Betts might have been prejudiced by the
absence of counsel.'
Justice Black wrote again in Gideon v. Wainwright,"2 but this
time it was an opinion for the Court joined by Justice Douglas, a
fellow dissenter in Betts, and five Justices appointed in the twenty-
before justices of the peace and "presumably" even offenses tried in traffic court.
In fact, the Court argued, "the logic of the petitioners' position would even require
appointment of counsel in civil cases." Ibid.
107 Id. at 472, 473.
108 Id. at 474. This was the position he later developed more fully in Adamson
v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 71-72 (1947).
109 287 U.S. 45 (1932). M Id. at 474.
110 Id. at 477. See note 318 infra. 112 372 US. 335.
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two-year interim since Betts.113 Clarence Gideon, like Smith Betts,
was an indigent convicted of a felony (breaking and entering with
intent to commit a misdemeanor) in a state (Florida) court. Like
Betts he had made a request for the assignment of counsel that had
been rejected. Again like Betts, Gideon had pleaded not guilty and
had conducted his own defense; but his trial was before a jury.
Found guilty and sentenced to five years' imprisonment, he fled a
writ of habeas corpus in the Florida Supreme Court that was re-
jected. The United States Supreme Court then granted certiorari,
its order directing counsel "to discuss in their briefs and oral argu-
ments the following: Should this Court's holding in Betts v. Brady
... be reconsidered."
14
Justice Black's opinion in Gideon started out by employing one
of the common techniques of overruling opinions. Noting the vari-
ous similarities in the fact situations of Betts and Gideon, he found
the two cases "so nearly indistinguishable" that "the Betts v. Brady
holding if left standing would require [the Court] . . . to reject
Gideon's claim."-"5 Accordingly, the Court was compelled to re-
consider the validity of the Betts decision. On this score, the opin-
ion accepted "the Betts v. Brady assumption, based as it was on...
prior cases, that a provision of the Bill of Rights which is 'funda-
mental and essential to a fair trial' is made obligatory upon States
by the Fourteenth Amendment.' " 6 It disagreed, however, with the
conclusion "that the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of counsel is
not one of these fundamental rights." Support for this disagreement
was found primarily in pre-Betts precedents. Justice Black pointed
out that, ten years before Betts, in Powell v. Alabama, "[the]
Court, after full consideration of all the historical data examined in
Betts, had unequivocally declared that the 'right to the aid of coun-
sel is of this fundamental character.' "1 He also noted that seven
years later in Grosjean v. American Press Co., 118 the "right of the
accused to the aid of counsel in a criminal prosecution" had been
113 Chief Justice Warren, and Justices Brennan, Stewart, White, and Goldberg.
"14 370 U.S. 908. Cf. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
115 372 US. at 339. The Court did not mention the difference between the jury
trial in Gideon and the non-jury trial in Betts, although the Betts Court had stressed
that factor. See 316 U.S. at 474.
116 372 U.S. at 342. 117 Id. at 342-43. 118297 U.S. 233 (1936).
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listed as one of those fundamental rights of the first eight Amend-
ments that were "safeguarded against state actions by the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."'119 Similar support
was found in Johnson v. Zerbst,120 Avery v. Alabama,'21 and
Smith v. O'Grady,2 other cases decided before Betts. The opinion
concluded that "the Court in Betts v. Brady [had] made an abrupt
break with its own well considered precedents." "In returning to
these old precedents" the present Court was merely "restor[ing]
constitutional principles established to achieve a fair system of
justice.'
23
Justice Black's opinion went on to find that the rejection of the
Betts rule was supported "not only" by these pre-Betts precedents
but also by "reason and reflection." The absolute necessity of the
assistance of counsel in order to obtain a fair trial was, he stated,
"an obvious truth," evidenced by the fact "that government hires
lawyers to prosecute and defendants who have money hire lawyers
to defend."'' 2 As a further illustration of this absolute need for
counsel, Justice Black quoted with approval the following passage
from Justice Sutherland's opinion in Powell (which had also been
cited in his Betts dissent) :125
The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little
avail if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by coun-
sel. Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and
sometimes no skill in the science of law. If charged with crime,
he is incapable, generally, of determining for himself whether
the indictment is good or bad. He is unfamiliar with the rules
of evidence. Left without the aid of counsel he may be put on
trial without a proper charge, and convicted upon incompe-
tent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue or otherwise
inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and knowledge adequate-
ly to prepare his defense, even though he have a perfect one.
He requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the
proceedings against him. Without it, though he be not guilty,
he faces the danger of conviction because he does not know
how to establish his innocence.
119 372 US. at 343, quoting from 297 U.S. 233, 243-44.
120 304 U.S. 458 (1938). 123 372 U.S. at 344.
121308 US. 444 (1940). 124 Id. at 344.
125 Id. at 344-45, quoting 287 U.S. at 68-69.122 312 U.S. 329 (1941).
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Justice Black concluded by noting that Betts v. Brady, having "de-
parted from the sound wisdom" of Powell, had been "an anachro-
nism when handed down"'126 and was now properly overruled.
Although the decision to overrule Betts was unanimous, there
were three separate opinions by individual Justices. A short con-
curring opinion by Justice Douglas was concerned solely with the
general relationship of the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth
Amendment. 127 The opinions of the other two Justices, however,
dealt with the indigent's right to counsel and the overruling of
Betts. Justice Clark concurred in the final judgment on the grounds
that the Court should no longer distinguish between defendants in
non-capital cases like Gideon and those in capital cases, where the
right to appointment of counsel was absolute.12 Justice Harlan's
concurrence, as previously mentioned, was critical of the Court's
treatment of the Betts decision, particularly the charge that it had
departed from prior precedent. Justice Harlan would have over-
ruled Betts on the ground that the rule of that case "was no longer
a reality," having been eaten away by exceptions, and that its for-
mal rejection was necessary to clarify lower court appreciation of
the actual state of the law.
129
B. BETTS AS A DEPARTURE FROM PRECEDENT
Justice Black's opinion in Gideon relied essentially on two points:
Betts was clearly erroneous as a matter of reason and Betts itself had
been an "abrupt" departure from well-established prior decisions.
The first point represents, of course, the basic argument of most
overruling cases. 130 It could, perhaps, have been stated more per-
suasively,' 3' but, in any event, it expresses no more than the dis-
126 372 U.S. at 345. Justice Black noted that this characterization of Betts was
suggested by the twenty-two states that argued amicus curiae for the overrule of
that case. The language was used in the states' brief in describing the relation
of Betts to the state practices at the time that case was decided.
1
2 7 Id. at 345. 129 Id. at 350-52.
128 Id. at 347-49. 130 See text at note 39 supra.
131 In particular, the state's customary employment of a lawyer as prosecutor
hardly seems the most compelling argument for the proposition that "the accused
cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him." But see Green,
The Bill of Rights, the Fourteenth Amendment and the Supreme Court, 46 Micu.
L. REv. 869, 883 (1948).
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agreement of the present members of the Court with the logic of
their predecessors. The dominant characteristic of overruling opin-
ions has been, however, the Court's consistent reliance upon moie
than just the alleged superiority of the views of its present member-
ship as the basis for rejecting a precedent. In Gideon, this supple-
mentary support for overruling obviously must come, if at all, from
the second point of the Court's opinion.
The contention that "the Court in Betts v. Brady made an abrupt
break with its own well considered precedents"' 32 represents an-
other form of the common practice of depreciating the original
significance of the rejected case. It has been used infrequently be-
fore.3 3 Overruled cases have been characterized previously as a
"sport in the law,"' 134 an "arbitrary break with the past,"' 135 and
simply as a "departure" from well-accepted principles.13 The ob-
jective of this emphasis upon inconsistency with earlier decisions
is much the same as that rationale based upon inconsistency with
later decisions. The Court is placed in a position to reject a prece-
dent and at the same time claim adherence to stare decisis. As one
opinion put it, "stare decisis is a principle of policy and not a
mechanical formula of adherence to the latest decision, however
recent and questionable, when such adherence involves collision
with a prior doctrine more embracing in its scope, intrinsically
sounder, and verified by experience."'M3 Accordingly, though the
tactic of emphasizing the abrupt departure of the overruled de-
cision from prior precedent may not provide the "more respectful
132 372 U.S. at 344.
133See United States v. Darby, 312 US. 100 (1941); California v. Thompson,
313 U.S. 109, 115-16 (1941); State Tax Corm'n v. Aldrich, 316 U.S. 174, 179 (1942);
see also Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 114-15 (1940) (non-constitutional
overruling); of. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56,64-65 (1950). The criticism
on this level is likely to be much more severe in a concurring opinion than in the
Court's opinion. Compare Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 297 (1942),
with id. at 307 (Frankfurter, J, concurring), and State Tax Comm'n v. Aldrich,
316 U.S. 174, 179 'with id. at 183 (1942) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
'34 Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 112-13 (1945).
135 Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. at 307 (concurring opinion).
136 California v. Thompson, 313 U.S. at 116.
'37 Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. at 119; see State Tax Comm'n v. Aldrich, 316
U.S. at 183.
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burial" that Justice Harlan requested, 38 it serves to characterize the
Court's decision as an automatic correction of a rare judicial freak
independently of any change in the Court's personnel.
While the "departure-from-precedent" rationale employed in
Gideon is thus an effective overruling technique, its applicability to
the Gideon situation is highly questionable. Betts v. Brady, what-
ever its other defects, is not a very likely candidate for the role of
an eccentric among precedents. The Court's opinion in Gideon
stressed particularly the inconsistency between Betts and Powell v.
Alabama, but a close reading of Powell seems to support Justice
Harlan's view that Betts fell well within the basic pattern cut by
the Powell opinion.139 Justice Black's analysis seems to ignore the
fact that Powell dealt primarily with the historically separate right
of the individual to employ his own counsel,1 40 and it was only in
the last few pages of Justice Sutherland's lengthy opinion that he
considered the state's duty to appoint counsel.141 Thus, Justice
Black stresses that Powell, after examining the same history as
Betts, had declared that the right to counsel was "fundamental,'
142
but both the historical analysis and the cited declaration were made
concerning the right to employ counsel. 48 When the Powell opin-
ion turned to the state's duty to appoint counsel, it carefully re-
stricted its ruling to the type of situation presented by the case
before the Court: "a capital case... where the defendant... is
incapable adequately of making his own defense because of igno-
rance, feeble mindedness, illiteracy or the like."' 44 Justice Black
138 372 U.S. at 349. See text at note 18 supra.
139 Id. at 341-43, 349-50.
140 Allen, The Supreme Court, Federalism, and State Criminal Justice, 8 DE PAUL
L. REv. 213,224 (1959); cf. Firxtmo, THE UNrrED STATES Su Rarsu COURT 50-58 (1961).
141 287 U.S. at 71-73. 142 372 U.S. at 343, citing 287 U.S. at 68.
143 287 U.S. at 60-68. See Kadish, Methodology and Criteria in Due Process Ad-
judication-A Survey and Criticism, 66 YA_.E L. J. 319, 329 (1957). But cf. Green,
supra note 131, at 879. It should be noted that several of the state cases cited by
Justice Sutherland as "recogniz[ing] the right to the aid of counsel as fundamental"
did involve appointed counsel, although the issue usually concerned matters such as
failure to grant counsel sufficient time to prepare his case. See, e.g., State v. Ferris,
16 La. Ann. 424 (1862); Sheppard v. State, 165 Ga. 460, 464 (1928); and State v.
Moore, 61 Kan. 732, 734 (1900). The Court later described the right to appointment
of counsel under the particular facts of the Powell case as fundamental. 287 U.S, a 73,
.44 287 U.S. at 71.
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discounted this restriction as an example of the Court's customary
practice of formally limiting its holdings, 145 a factor that did not
detract from the opinion's conclusion concerning the fundamental
nature of the right to counsel. Leaving aside the question how read-
ily such a standardized restriction should be disregarded, 1 6 the fact
is that the discussion of the state's duty to appoint counsel in
Powell was not limited merely by the usual incidental remark at
the end of the opinion concerning the scope of Court's ruling (as
was the case with respect to the Court's discussion of the right to
employ counsel). The restriction of the duty to appoint counsel to
circumstances involving illiterate or otherwise incapable defendants
was repeated throughout the Court's discussion. 147 Surely, the
Court in Powell would not have so continuously emphasized these
factors if a broader rule had been intended.148
This reading of Powell is supported by the context in which that
case arose as well as by the language of the opinion. Powell was,
after all, one of the first, if not the first, of the "modern" pro-
cedural due process cases.149 The duty to appoint counsel involved
a previously unconsidered area, unmentioned in petitioners' excel-
lent brief,1 0 and obviously containing various unforeseen possibili-
ties as to scope and application. Under these circumstances, it
would have been unusual for the Court even to suggest establishing
a flat rule requiring appointment in all cases.' 5' In keeping with the
traditional appellate function in a case of first impression,152 Justice
Sutherland obviously sought to decide the particular question be-
145 372 U.S. at 343.
140 Cf. Allen, supra note 140, at 224, on the importance of such limitation to "the
operation of the judicial process in a Fourteenth Amendment case."
147 287 U.S. at 71-73. Within the space of a few pages, the Court made over
a half-dozen references to the special circumstances that entitled defendants to
appointed counsel.
148 Cf., e.g., Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 US. 458 (1937).
149 Allen, supra note 140, at 223.
150 Brief for Petitioners, pp. 48-60. The brief relied on many grounds in addition
to the counsel problem.
151 This is particularly true when one considers that Sutherland was author of the
opinion. See Felman, The Federal Right to Counsel in State Courts, 31 Nm. L. REV.
15,19 (1951).
1 52 LLwmwYYx, THE CommoN LAw TA moN 306-10 (1960).
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fore him while at the same time allowing for such future growth as
the Court might later find desirable. 58 Thus, the emphasis upon the
right to a fair hearing rather than the specific terms of the Sixth
Amendment provided for the possibility of a flexible expansion of
the right to appointed counsel in keeping with the Court's view of
due process. 54 This cautious approach was taken even in the opin-
ion's eloquent description of the defendant's need for counsel that
Justice Black quoted at length in Gideon.5 5 Justice Sutherland's
statement was carefully limited by its first sentence: 'Il "the right to
be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not com-
prehend the right to be heard by counsel." Powell v. Alabama pro-
vided a steppingstone to either a Betts or a Gideon, depending
upon how far and how fast the Court utilized the opinion's poten-
tial for expansion.' 57 Certainly, neither would have been an "abrupt
break" from the precedent, or even the "wisdom," of the Powell
decision. 58
The other pre-Betts cases cited in Gideon scarcely furnish any
more support for the Court's characterization of Betts as an "ab-
rupt break" from precedent. Admittedly, the portion of the Gros-
jean opinion quoted by Justice Black did describe Powell as holding
15 3 Thus, the Powell opinion has been described as a "model" of the traditional
due process approach of deciding the case at hand while providing for expansion.
Allen, The Supreme Court and State Criminal Justice, 4 WAYmN L. REv. 191, 192
(1958). See also Fellman, supra note 151; B.AmNY, Tim RIGHT TO CoUSrEL IN AMI-
cwCOURTS 155 (1955).
154 See Allen, supra note 153, and Fellman, supra note 151.
155 See BEaNzy, op. cit. supra note 153, at 155. This section of Justice Sutherland's
opinion has been quoted often in later opinions. See, e.g., Williams v. Kaiser, 323 U.S.
471, 475 (1945); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 463 (1938); Bute v. Illinois, 333
U.S. 640, 680 (1948) (Douglas, J, dissenting).
156 287 U.S. at 68-69. (Emphasis added.) 157 Allen, supra note 140, at 225.
158 "Commentators were rather cautious in estimating (Powell's) effect." BwAzY,
op. cit. supra note 153, at 156. The possible extension of the Powell reasoning to all
felony cases was not always recognized. See Ireton, Due Process in Criminal Trials,
67 U.S.L. Rav. 83 (1933); Nutting, The Supreme Court, the Fourteenth Amendment
and State Capital Cases, 3 U. C. L. REv. 244 (1936). Where it was anticipated,
such an extension was usually treated as something less than a foregone conclusiu.
Comment, Constitutional Law-Due Process and Equal Protection-The Right to
Counsel, 31 Micr. L. REv. 245 (1932); Note, 17 MINN. L. Rav. 415 (1933); Note,
22 VA. L. Rrv. 957 (1936); 18 IA. L. REv. 383 (1933); 81 U. PA. L. REV. 337 (1933);
18 ST. Louis L. 11v. 161 (1933).
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that "the right of an accused to the aid of counsel" was "funda-
mental,"' 59 but here again the reference was probably to the right
to employ counsel.160 In any event, a short statement in a free-
speech case attempting to illustrate the relationship between the
Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment can hardly be taken
as a significant authority on the scope of the indigent's right to
appointed counsel. 16' The ambiguous nature of the Grosjean type
of statement is well illustrated by a similar discussion of the scope
of the Fourteenth Amendment in Palko v. Connecticut,'6 2 a pre-
Betts decision which Justice Black did not cite. In Palko, Justice
Cardozo described Powell in almost the same terms as Grosjean
when he listed the various rights protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment,6 3 but, at another point, he recognized, and indeed
stressed, that Powell "had turned upon the fact that in the particu-
lar situation laid before us in the evidence the benefit of counsel
was essential to the substance of a hearing."' "e Smith v. O'Grady6 5
and Avery v. Alabama,66 other cases cited in Gideon, have essen-
tially the same weakness in terms of their precedental significance
as does Grosjean.167 In Avery there was an ambiguous suggestion
that the refusal to appoint counsel would have been a denial of due
159 'We concluded that certain fundamental rights, safeguarded by the first eight
amendments against federal action, were also safeguarded against state action by the
due process of law clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and among them the funda-
mental right of the accused to the aid of counsel in a criminal prosecution." Grosjean
v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 243-44 (1936).
160 But see Note, Betts v. Brady, 21 Cm.-KENr L. Rxv. 107 (1942). It is interesting
to note that Justice Roberts, who wrote Betts, described Pawell in approximately
the same terms in his dissent in Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 133 (1934).
161 The Court there held that a privilege tax levied on a publisher violated the
freedom of the press protected under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 297 US. at 244-45.
162 302 US. 319, 324 (1937). 163 Id. at 324-25.
164 Id. at 327. See Green, The Bill of Rights, the Fourteenth Amendment and the
Supreme Court, 46 MicH. L. Rxv. 869, 873 n.24 (1948), suggesting that this difference
in description was "apparently intended to distinguish between the right to represen-
tation by counsel, with its corollaries, and the right of appointment of counsel
for the indigent accused."
165 312 US. 329 (1941). 166 308 U. 444 (1940).
167 "[Smith and Avery] did not significantly expand or clarify the law as it had
been left by the decision of Powel." Allen, supra note 140, at 225,
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process, but this was only an offhand remark of an opinion con-
cerned solely with the denial of appointed counsel's request for a
continuance. 1 8 Similarly, in Smith, the failure to appoint counsel
was only one of numerous allegations held to add up to a denial of
due process in a fact situation similar to that in Powell.8 9
The remaining case cited by Justice Black, Johnson v. Zerhst,
170
provides his strongest support, but hardly goes so far as to make
Betts an aberration. The Court in Johnson specifically character-
ized the indigent's right to appointment of counsel as a "funda-
mental human right" based upon the "obvious truth that the aver-
age defendant does not have the professional legal skill to protect
himself.'1' Johnson, however, dealt with the federal courts, and
the Court there spoke solely in terms of the right to appointment
under the Sixth Amendment. 7 2 Powell, and later cases like Palko,
on the other hand, repeatedly had emphasized the limited relevance
of the specific terms of the Bill of Rights in determining standards
applicable to state courts under the Fourteenth Amendment. 7 3 So,
while Johnson might have had the force of a persuasive analogy, it
was hardly a binding precedent insofar as the right to appointed
counsel under the Due Process Clause was concernedY.
7 4
168 Although counsel had been appointed, the opinion (by Justice Black) noted
that "[hiad petitioner been denied any representation of counsel at all, such a clear
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of assistance of counsel would
have required a reversal of his conviction." 308 US. at 445. The Court cited
Powell v. Alabama as direct authority for this statement. Avery like Powell was a
capital case, but the opinion did not recite any special disabilities of the defendants
as found in Powell.
109 The petitioner there charged that "he had been denied any real notice of the
true nature of the charge against him ... that because of deception by the state's
representatives he had pleaded guilty to a charge punishable by twenty years life
imprisonment; that his request for the benefit and advice of counsel had been denied
by the court and that he had been rushed to the penitentiary where his ignorance,
confinement and poverty had precluded the possibility of his securing counsel...
312 U.S. at 334.
170 304 U.S. 458 (1938). 171 Id. at 462-63.
172 Ibid. But cf. Kamisar, Betts v. Brady Twenty Years Later: The Right to
Counsel and Due Process Values, 61 Micn. L. REv. 219, 245 (1962).
173 See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 323-28 (1937); Brown v. Mississippi,
297 U.S. 278, 285 (1936); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 66-68 (1932); see also
Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105-06 (1934).
174 Justice Black also referred to "many other prior decisions," but did not
mention which ones he had in mind. There were only a few other decisions that
[1963
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In sum, even with Johnson, Justice Roberts' description of the
pre-Betts decisions as only "lend[ing] color" to the argument for
an unqualified constitutional right to appointed counsel would
seem more accurate than Justice Black's position that these deci-
sions logically and as precedents compelled enunciation of such a
right in Betts.175 Certainly, one might well have predicted, as some
commentators did,176 that the Court would impose the same re-
quirement for the appointment of counsel upon the states as it had
imposed upon the federal government. On the other hand, the
great significance which the Court had attached to the Palko doc-
trine constituted a clear warning that any such assumption was
highly speculative. 17 This uncertainty in the law prior to Betts was
perhaps best reflected by the split in the several lower court deci-
sions dealing with the right to appointed counsel during the period
between Johnson and BettsY. s1 If there was a clear precedent from
which Betts could depart, it certainly was not recognized by these
decisions, most of which adopted the Betts analysis. 179
Finally, even if Betts had been an aberration when decided,
Justice Black's emphasis upon this "abrupt break" with precedent
could hardly achieve the usual objective of that overruling tech-
nique in the context of the Gideon situation. The effectiveness of
this argument in depicting the overruling decision as part of a nat-
ural process of eliminating occasional "sports" in the law neces-
sarily requires that the overruled decision fit within the concept of
cited Po.ell and they added nothing. See, e.g., Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278
(1936); Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 70 (1942). Other cases like Walker v.
Johnson, 312 U.S. 275 (1940), dealt solely with the Sixth Amendment.
175 Cf. Allen, supra note 140; Comment, 23 TLxs L. REv. 66 (1944); Note, 31
ILL. B.J. 139 (1942). But see Note, 21 Cm.-KENTr L. REv. 107 (1942).
176 See BEANEY, THE RIGmT TO Co rNsEL IN A ramcAN CouRTs 170 (1955); Note,
The Indigents Right to Counsel and the Rule of Prejudicial Error, 97 U. PA. L. REv.
855 (1949); RorrscHAxrmi, H DBoon oF AMERIcaN CONSTTUTONAL LAW 811 (1939).
177 Consider also Adamson v. California, 332 US. 46 (1947), and Ward v. Texas,
316 US. 547 (1942).
178 Compare Commonwealth ex rel. Shaw v. Smith, 147 Pa. Super. 423 (1942);
Wilson v. Lanagan, 99 F.2d 544 (1st Cir. 1938), affirming 19 F. Supp. 870 (D. Mass.
1937), cert. denied, 306 U.. 634 (1939); Gall v. Brady, 39 F. Supp. 504 (D. Md.
1941); and Coates v. State, 180 Md. 502 (1942), with Boyd v. O'Grady, 121 F.2d 146
(8th Cir. 1941), and Carey v. Brady, 125 F.2d 253 (4th Cit. 1942).
179 See the first group of cases cited supra note 178; see also Lyons v. State, 77
Okla. Cr. 197 (1943); House v. State, 130 Fla. 400 (1937).
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a judicial oddity. The development of the law since Betts was de-
cided, however, made it impossible in 1963 to treat Betts as an "iso-
lated deviation from the strong current of precedents."' 80 During
the twenty-two years of its existence, the Betts rule had frequently
been acknowledged by the Court, once after a "full scale re-exami-
nation' 81 and often over vigorous dissents.18 2 It was hardly the
"derelict on the waters of the law' 813 that customarily has been
the subject of the "departure-from-precedent" reasoning. Thus, if
Justice Black had desired to offer some support for rejecting Betts
beyond the alleged superiority of the Court's present reasoning, he
would have best looked to the traditional overruling rationale based
upon changed circumstances, the lessons of experience, or the re-
quirements of later precedent.
III. Tm ALTERNATmS AVAILABLE IN GIDEON
A. TIlE FORCE OF SUBSEQUENT DECISIONS
The overruling rationale most clearly applicable in Gideon was
that based upon the force of inconsistent later decisions. There
were abundant instances where Bets had been undermined by sub-
sequent decisions dealing either with the right to appointed counsel
itself or with related problems.
1. The unqualified right to hire counseL-In a series of post-
Betts decisions, most notably Chandler v. Fretag,84 the Court had
clearly established prior to Gideon an "unqualified" right of the
individual to retain counsel at his own expense. 85 Unlike the right
1
80 Lambert v. California, 355 US. 225, 232 (1957).
181 Allen, supra note 140, at 227, referring to Bute v. Illinois, 333 US. 640 (1948),
which affirmed the Betts doctrine.
182 See, e.g., Foster v. Illinois, 332 US. 134 (1947); Bute v. Illinois, supra note 181;
Gryger v. Burke, 334 US. 736 (1947); see also Gayes v. New York, 332 US. 145
(1947). The failure of the Court to "squarely cite Betts as a constitutional precedent"
for the first few years of its life had suggested that it might indeed become a "sport
in the law:' See Allen, supra note 140, at 227; see also Mayo v. Wade, 158 F.2d 614
(5th Cir. 1946). But this possibility was eliminated by a series of later decisions,
including Bute. See Allen, id. at 226-32; see also Carter v. Illinois, 329 U.S. 173 (1946).
18 3 Lambert v. California, 355 US. at 232.
184 348 US. 3 (1954); see also Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 US. 570 (1960); Reynolds
v. Cochran, 365 US. 525 (1961); Hawk v. Olson, 326 U.S 271 (1945); House v.
Mayo, 324 U.S. 42 (1945).
185 348 US. at 9-10.
[19631
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to appointed counsel under Betts, the defendant's right here did not
depend on his showing that the lack of legal assistance would de-
prive him of a fair trial. Three years before Gideon, two members
of the Court had already suggested that the decisions establishing
this uniqualified right to employ counsel had removed any logical
basis for the qualified right to the appointment of counsel under
Betts.""8 The potential difficulty with this argument, however, lies
in its assumption that both rights are based on the same policy.
Any rule governing the right to appointed counsel will necessar-
ily be aimed at achieving that objective of procedural due process
that Professor Kadish has characterized as "insuring the reliability
of the guilt-determining process" by "reducing to a minimum the
possibility that an innocent individual will be punished."'1 7 Betts
accepted this goal, but assumed that counsel was not always needed
to achieve the "fair trial" that it demands. The right to retain
counsel obviously is designed to achieve this same objective, 88 and,
if that were its only function, then the unqualified nature of this
right clearly would be inconsistent with the premise of Betts. For,
if the use of one's own counsel is always necessary to insure a fair
trial, then certainly the use of appointed counsel must fall in the
same category-a defendant's need for counsel does not vary di-
rectly with his ability to afford one. 89
The right to employ one's own counsel, however, is also based
upon an additional value quite different from insuring reliability
of the guilt-determining process and not involved in the right to
appointed counsel. In cases like Chandler the Court is dealing not
merely with the state's duty to insure the fairness of the trial but
also with the state's interference with the individual's desire to
defend himself in whatever manner he deems best, using any legiti-
180 McNeal v. Culver, 365 US. 109, 117 (1960); see also Kamisar, Betts v. Brady
Twenty Years Later: The Right to Counsel and Due Process Values, 61 MICH. L.
REv. 219, 244 (1962); of. The Supreme Court, 1961 Term, 76 1Hi-v. L. REv. 115
(1962).
187 Kadish, Methodology and Criteria in Due Process Adjudication-A Survey
and Criticism, 66 YAmE L.J. 319, 346 (1957); see also Carter v. Illinois, 329 US. 173,
174 (1946); and Kamisar, supra note 186, at 219, 230.
188 Kamisar, supra note 186, at 228-30. See Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 US. 570
(1960); Reynolds v. Cochran, 365 U.S. 525 (1961).
189 In fact, it may be argued that the indigent has a greater need for counsel. See
Kamisar, supra note 186, at 227.
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mate means within his resources. 190 In other words, what is involved
here is a principle that fits within that category of procedural due
process rights designed to insure "respect for the dignity of the
individual." 19 1 The presence of this separate interest as a basis for
the defendant's right to retain counsel is suggested in some of the
earlier state constitutional guarantees that are phrased in terms of
the individual's right to represent himself.192 It is more clearly illus-
trated by the situation in which an accused refuses either to hire
counsel or accept an appointed counsel and insists upon conducting
his own defense.193 The Court here must consider not only the
need for a lawyer in order to preserve the reliability of the guilt-
determining process but also the possibly conflicting interest of the
individual in determining the means of his own defense.
This dual basis for the individual's right to retain counsel could
completely undermine the argument for rejecting Betts as incon-
sistent with later cases like Chandler. If the unqualified nature of
the right were founded upon this second due process value rather
than upon the objective of insuring a reliable guilt-determining
process, then the different rules for the right to employ counsel
and the right to appointed counsel could be easily reconciled.
Language in the cases following Chandler, however, indicates that
the absolute nature of the right to retain counsel probably has been
grounded solely upon the need to insure a reliable guilt-determin-
ing process. 94 The opinions in these cases particularly have stressed
the importance of counsel to assure the defendant a fair trial. In
the light of this emphasis, the decisions establishing an absolute
right to retain counsel certainly provided as strong a basis for re-
considering and overruling Betts as Classic provided with respect
19Q Cf. id. at 228.
191 Kadish, supra note 187, at 347. As to the "hybrid" quality of the values served
by many procedural rights, see Kamisar, supra note 186, at 238-39.
192 BEAnY, Thn RIGHT vo CouNsmS N AmgIcAN CounTs 18-22 (1955).
193 People v. Mattson, 51 Cal.2d 777 (1959); Linden v. Dickson, 278 F.2d 755 (9th
Cir. 1960); Reynolds v. United States, 267 F.2d 235 (9th Cir. 1959); cf. Cannon v.
Gladden, 203 F. Supp. 504 (D. Ore. 1962).
'94See, e.g, Reynolds v. Cochran, 365 U.S. 525, 532-33 (1961); Ferguson v.
Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 594-95 (1961); see also Chandler v. Fretag, 348 U.S. 3, 9-10
(1954).
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to Grovey v. Townsend, or the coerced confession cases with re-
spect to Wolf v. Colorado."9 5
2. Betts and Equal Protection.-If Chandler v. Fretag and its
progeny had not "removed the underpinnings" from the Betts rule
by themselves, they certainly did so when added to Griffin v. Illi-
nois,196 and its offspring.197 Briefly stated, Griffin held that where
state law conditioned appellate review upon the availability of a
stenographic transcript or report of the trial proceedings, the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment demanded that
the state make the same review available to defendants who were
financially unable to submit the transcript or report. Various com-
mentators,198 including two of our most distinguished judges, 99
have suggested that the general philosophy underlying Griffin may
well make the appointment of counsel to represent indigents an
essential requirement of equal protection. Certainly, Justice Black's
opinion for four members of the Griffin majority went beyond
the limited problem of providing transcripts when it stressed the
broad objective of affording equal opportunity to the indigent and
pecunious defendant. In particular, the opinion contained the
sweeping statement that "there can be no equal justice where the
kind of trial a man gets depends on the amount of money he has." 20
The relationship between this central theme of the Griffin case and
Betts v. Brady has been succinctly stated by Justice Walter V.
Schaefer: 201
105 Here, also, there had been a valid ground for distinction until the Court indi-
cated that the exclusion of confessions was not aimed merely at elimination of unre-
liable evidence but also at deterring illegal police practices. See Allen, Due Process
and State Criminal Procedures: Another Look, 48 Nw. L. REv. 16, 17-21, 25-28
(1953).
190 351 US. 12, 18 (1956).
107See Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); see also Burns v. Ohio, 360
U.S. 252 (1959); Eslridge v. Washington, 357 U.S. 214 (1958); Smith v. Bennett,
365 U.S. 708 (1961); Douglas v. Greene, 363 U.S. 192 (1960). See Allen, Griffin v.
Illinois: Antecedents and Aftermath, 25 U. Cm. L. Rxv. 151 (1957).
108 See articles cited in Holly v. Smyth, 280 F.2d 536, 541-42 n.8 (4th Cir. 1960).
See also Comment, Appointment of Counsel for Indigent Defendents in Criminal
Appeals, [1959] Dun L. J. 484, 488; Allen, supra note 197, at 156-57.
199 Schaefer, Federalism and State Criminal Procedure, 70 HARv. L. REv. 1, 10
(1956); Traynor, J., in People v. Brown, 55 Cal. 2d 64 (1960); cf. People v. Breslin,
4 N.Y. 2d 73 (1958).
200 351 U.S. at 19. 201 Schaefer, supra note 199, at 10.
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The analogy to the right to counsel is close indeed: if a
state allows one who can afford to retain a lawyer to be rep-
resented by counsel, and so to obtain a different kind of trial,
it must furnish the same opportunity to those who are unable
to hire a lawyer. Since indigence is constitutionally an irrele-
vance, it would seem that a successful argument might be
based upon the proposition that the defendant by reason of his
poverty is deprived of a right available to those who can
afford to exercise it.
Though the analogy described by Justice Schaefer is indeed
"close," it is far from perfect. Some significant criticisms have been
leveled against the position that the decision in Griffin required the
overruling of Bett. 202 When the broad language of Justice Black's
opinion is limited to the context of the Griffin fact situation,
203
various grounds can be advanced for distinguishing between the
problem of appointing counsel and that of providing a trial tran-
script. One factor frequently stressed is the difference in the nature
of the state action in the two situations."0 In Griffin, the appeal
was an integral part of the state's process for determining criminal
liability.2 5 In making a transcript or report the prerequisite for
appeal, the state effectively denied the indigent access to a major
portion of this process. In Betts, on the other hand, the Court dealt
not with the defendant's access to the criminal process but with
the separate problem of insuring the efficacy of the process-a
problem that is more properly analyzed in terms of fairness than
equality.208 Betts could only be compared to Griffin, so the argu-
ment goes, if a state conditioned the right to a criminal trial upon
the presence of counsel.
This criticism of the Griffin analogy is supplemented by the
contention that a view of equal protection that necessitates over-
202 See Comment, Post-Conviction Due Process-Right of Indigent to Review of
Nonconstitutional Trial Errors, 55 MicH. L. REv. 413 (1957); Qua, Griffin v. Illinois,
25 U. Cm. L. REv. 143, 150 (1957); and Kamisar, supra note 186, at 244-45.
203 See Comment, The Effect of Griffin v. Illinois on the State's Administration
of Criminal Law, 25 U. Cm. L. REv. 161, 170 (1957); Kamisar, supra note 186, at
244-45.
2 04 See Comment, supra note 202; Comment, supra note 198.
205 Allen, The Supreme Court and State Criminal Justice, 4 WAYm L. Rnv. 191,
194 (1958).
2o0 Kamisar, supra note 186, at 247-48.
[1963
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ruling Betts would lack any "limiting principles. 2 0 7 If constitu-
tionally required equality of treatment includes the appointment of
counsel, then it may also include the provision of funds for psy-
chiatrists, investigators, reimbursement of witnesses' expenses, and
more. 20° The accused may insist that equal protection requires not
just those resources that are ordinarily necessary to insure the
accuracy of the guilt-determining process but the same resources
that may offer the more affluent individual a better chance of gain-
ing acquittal even when guilty. Furthermore, this view of equal
protection could easily be extended beyond the criminal proceed-
ing to encompass habeas corpus and even ordinary civil proceed-
ings201 (although a distinction between the civil and criminal proc-
ess might be based on the ground that the latter is initiated by the
government for the achievement of a governmental purpose and
entails the imposition of severe sanctions). Such an almost unre-
stricted scope of applicability, it is argued, reveals the fundamental
weakness in a concept of equal protection that ignores the basic
distinctions between the Griffin and Betts situations.
In view of the substantial nature of these criticisms, the refusal
of a Court to employ the Griffin analogy in overruling Betts ordi-
narily would be both justified and understandable. In the particular
circumstances surrounding Gideon, however, the Court's failure to
rely on this ground was merely puzzling. For, on the very same
day that Gideon was decided, the Court necessarily faced and
rejected each of these criticisms in reaching its decision in a com-
panion case, Douglas v. California.21° The Court there held invalid
on equal protection grounds the California practice of refusing to
appoint counsel on an appeal by an indigent when the appellate
court, after reviewing the trial record, concluded that "no good
whatever could be served" by the appointment. 11 Justice Douglas'
opinion for a six-member majority21 2 found no difference between
207 Allen, supra note 205, at 198.
208 See United States ex rel. Smith v. Bald, 192 F.2d 540 (3d Cir. 1951); see also
Kamisar, supra note 186, at 250-51.
209 Cf. Jacoby, Legal Aid to the Poor, 53 HIv. L. REv. 940, 942-44 (1940).
210 372 U.S. 353 (1963). 211 Id. at 355.
2
12 Justices Clark, Harlan, and Stewart dissented. Of these only Justice Stewart
joined the Court's opinion in Gideon.
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the state's refusal to give the indigent a transcript in Griffin and its
refusal to provide counsel on appeal. In either case, the opinion
noted, there was "discrimination against the indigent... for there
can be no equal justice where the kind of an appeal a man enjoys
depends on the amount of money he has. 213 This conclusion seems
clearly to deny the relevance of those factors that might have
distinguished Betts from Griffin. Once the Court has found that
Griffin requires equality in the quality as well as the right of appeal,
it necessarily follows that the same type of equality is required at
the trial level.2 14 As one of the dissenting opinions in Douglas noted,
the Court's decision in that case made the Gideon analysis of the
right to appointed counsel under the Due Process Clause "wholly
unnecessary." 2165 The decision in Douglas on equal protection
grounds provided the Court with an a fortiori basis for overruling
Betts. It presented a far stronger example of the subsequent devel-
opment of a principle in a related area that had undermined the
overruldd case than those situations in which the Court previously
had used that line of reasoning.216 Nevertheless, the Court care-
fully avoided any mention of the Equal Protection Clause in Gid-
eon. In fact, there is some indication that the Douglas case, orig-
inally argued during the 1961 Term, was set over for reargument
during the 1962 Term so as to avoid an earlier decision that would
have effectively foreclosed the full-scale re-examination of Betts on
due process grounds.217
213 372 U.S. 355 (1963), quoting 351 U.S. 12, at 19.
214 See Hamley, The Impact of Griffin v. Illinois on State Court-Federal Court
Relationships, 24 F.R.D. 75, 79 (1959); Comment, supra note 203, at 171.
215 372 U.S. at 363 (Harlan, J., dissenting). There had been indications in a
prior opinion that the Court might consider the question of counsel on appeal
primarilk in terms of the Due Process Clause. In Newsom v. Smyth, 365 U.S. 604
(1961), the Court dismissed its writ of certiorari on the ground that the defendant's
right of counsel on appeal had not been properly presented below. The per curiam
opinion stated that certiorari had been granted to consider the problem under the
Due Process Clause. 365 U.S. 604 (1961). A dissent arguing against dismissal, how-
ever, referred to the question as one involving the Equal Protection Clause. 365 US.
604, 607 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
216 Cf. the cases cited note 62 supra.
217 Douglas was originally argued in April, 1962, before five members of the
subsequent six-member majority. On June 4, 1962, certiorari in Gideon was granted
with counsel directed to the question whether Betts should be overruled. 370 U.S.
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3. The capital offense exception.-Prior to the Douglas decision,
the most obvious ground for the argument that Betts had been
undermined by a contrary principle adopted in later cases was that
suggested in Justice Clark's concurring opinion in Gideon21 --the
development of a special exception to the Betts "fair trial" rule in
cases involving crimes punishable by death. In the capital case, the
Court had held that the Due Process Clause imposed an automatic
requirement that counsel be appointed; there was no need to show
that, under the particular facts of the case, the absence of counsel
would result in a trial lacking in fundamental fairness. This depart-
ure from the case-by-case analysis of the Betts rule was gradual.
While Justice Sutherland's opinion in Powell emphasized that the
defendants there "stood in deadly peril of their lives," it also stressed
various other factors including "the ignorance and illiteracy of the
defendants, their youth," and "the circumstances of public hostil-
ity. '2 19 One of the pre-Betts cases following Powell possibly could
be read as suggesting an unqualified right to appointed counsel in
capital cases, but there was no explicit statement to that effect.220
It was not until 1948, in Bute v. Illinois,22' that the capital offense
exception was explicitly acknowledged, and then only in dictum.
This dictum was repeated in later decisions,222 but it was only in
908 (1962). On June 25, 1962, reargument was ordered in Douglas, 370 U.S. 930.
The Court did not direct counsel's attention on reargument to any special question,
as is often done. If the decision in Douglas had been handed down in June, 1962, the
Court would have found itself in the awkward position of having already answered
the question to which counsel in Gideon were directed. The Court might well have
felt that the question of overruling Betts should be faced "head on" rather than
in a case involving counsel on appeal. This is all, of course, in the realm of specula-
tion, and various other explanations of the juxtaposition of the two cases are equally
plausible. It should be noted, moreover, that the Court had indicated a willingness
to consider the question of counsel on appeal a full two years before Gideon was de-
cided. See Newsom v. Smyth, certiorari granted, 363 U.S. 802 (1960), dismissed
for failure to present a federal question, 365 U.S. 604 (1961).
218 372 US. at 348.
210 287 US. at 71; see also Williams v. Kaiser, 323 U.S. 471 (1944).
220 Avery v. Alabama, 308 US. 444 (1940). But see Williams v. Kaiser, 323 U.S.
471 (1945), a post-Betts case dealing with a capital crime and emphasizing special
circumstances that required the appointment of counsel. id. at 474-75; see also
Tompkins v. Missouri, 323 U.S. 485 (1944).
221 333 US. 640, 674 (1948).
222 See, e.g, Uveges v. Pennsylvania, 335 U.S. 437, 441 (1948).
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Hamilton v. Alabama,223 decided two years before Gideon, that
the Court for the first time squarely based its decision on the
ground that the case before it involved a capital crime and its
reversal therefore did not require a showing of prejudice resulting
from the absence of counsel.
The special rule for capital cases has been continuously criticized
by commentators as basically inconsistent with the thesis of the
Betts rule.224 It frequently has been noted that the need for skilled
representation may be as great in non-capital cases as in capital
cases, that non-capital offenses in fact are often more complex and
more difficult to defend than various offenses classified as capital in
different states.225 Certainly, there is no greater likelihood that a
defendant on a first-degree murder charge will be more capable of
adequately conducting his own defense in Michigan, which long
ago abolished capital punishment, than in Ohio, where the death
penalty still prevails.2 26 The Court has never answered directly this
claim of inconsistency inherent in the capital-noncapital distinc-
tion. Opinions of individual Justices, however, have suggested that
the special exception for capital cases was justified by the awesome
finality of the death penalty.227 In light of this factor, it was ex-
plained, the Court had been "especially sensitive of the demands
... for procedural fairness" by taking the extra precaution of im-
posing an absolute requirement of counsel.228
Aside from its logical difficulties, in terms of both the text of the
Fourteenth Amendment 229 and its implicit admission of the likely
223 368 U.S. 52 (1961).
224 See, e.g., the articles cited in notes 225, 226, 229, and 233, infra.
225 Allen, The Supreme Court, Federalism, and State Criminal justice, 8 DE PAUL
L. Rnv. 213, 230-31 (1959).
226 Kamisar, supra note 186, at 256.
227 See Kinsella v. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234, 255-56 (1960) (Harlan, J., dissenting);
Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 45-46 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); see also
Williams v. Georgia, 349 U.S. 375, 391 (1955). But see Note, 97 U. PA. L. Ray. 865
(1949).
228 354 U.S. at 65, 77; 361 U.S. at 255. The opinions have not attempted to support
the capital-noncapital distinction on the grounds that it "finds support in history."
See Kamisar, supra note 186, at 258-59.
229 Commentators have frequently noted that "The Fourteenth Amendment speaks
equally of life [and] liberty." Comment, 12 DE PAUL L. REv. 115, 118 (1962).
E1963
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inaccuracy of the fair trial rule, this position had been thoroughly
undermined by recent Court decisions rejecting a capital-noncapital
distinction in related areas of constitutional law. In Kinsella v.
Singleton230 the Court refused to distinguish between noncapital
and capital offenses as regards the application of various constitu-
tional rights under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to civilian
dependents of military personnel stationed overseas.231 Later in
Ferguson v. Georgia,23 2 the Court rejected the suggestion that this
distinction be made applicable to the right to retain counsel. Yet,
after both of these decisions, the Court adhered to an unqualified
requirement for appointment of counsel in Hamilton. This would
seem to add up to a "ready-made" situation for the traditional
argument that the overruled case must be rejected in order to
maintain consistency with a contrary position adopted in a sub-
sequent decision. Admittedly, there is a certain air of unreality in
relying only now on an inconsistency that has been apparent over
the years,233 but then again, as Justice Clark noted, it was not until
Hamilton that the capital-offense exception was squarely upheld.23 4
4. The special circumstances rule.-There remains what may
have been the best ground, at least in terms of the function of an
overruling opinion, for arguing that the rejection of Betts was
necessitated by the course of subsequent decisions. In his concur-
ring opinion, Justice Harlan suggested that the Betts rule had been
so "substantially... eroded" by decisions requiring the appoint-
ment of counsel in noncapital cases that it was "no longer a real-
ity. "235 The reference here was to a steady stream of cases since
Betts that had attempted to determine under what circumstances
the failure to appoint counsel would result in a trial lacking in
"fundamental fairness.123 6 The "special circumstances" found in
230 361 U.S. 234 (1960).
231 Id. at 246. 232 365 US. 570, 596 (1960).
233 See, e.g., Note, 95 U. PA. L. Rv. 793 (1947); Allen, supra note 225, at 230;
Note, 10 Prrr. L. REv. 232 (1948).
234 See particularly Justice Clark's attitude toward this exception in Crooker v.
California, 357 US. 433, 441 n.6 (1958).
235 372 U.S. at 350-51.
236 During the period between Betts and Gideon, the Court considered more than
thirty cases involving claims based upon the lack of counsel in state trials. In most
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these cases to require the appointment of counsel generally fell
into three categories: (1) the personal characteristics of the de-
fendant, such as youth or mental incapacity; (2) "the complicated
nature of the offense charged and the possible defenses thereto";3 7
and (3) events during the trial that raised difficult legal problems.
Although many indigent defendants have the characteristics found
in the first category, 38 the primary erosion of the Betts rule came
through the decisions relying upon circumstances falling within the
second and third categories.239 In fact, even prior to Gideon, two
fairly recent decisions from this group-Hudson v. North Caro-
lina2 40 and Chewning v. Cunningham24 1-had been recognized as
effectively abrogating the Betts rule.2 "
In Hudson, decided in 1960, the petitioner and two companions
had been tried before a jury in a North Carolina court on a charge
of these, the Court's decision dealt with the Betts rule. See Schilke, The Right to
Counsel-An Unrecognized Right, 2 WM. & MARY L. Ray. 318, 321 (1960) ("right
to counsel [had] been principally decided ... twenty-three times" between 1942 and
1960).
237 Uveges v. Pennsylvania, 335 U.S. 437, 441 (1948); see Note, 109 U. PA. L. Rav.
623, 625 (1961).
238 This takes into consideration such factors as age, experience in court, literacy,
and mental ability or retardation. See, e.g., Palmer v. Ashe, 342 U.S. 134 (1951);
Wade v. Mayo, 334 U.S. 672 (1948); see also Note, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 623, 625-26
(1961) (collecting cases that relied upon such factors to find that counsel was re-
quired). Most of the special circumstances cases have fallen within this category.
The Supreme Court, 1961 Term, 76 HARv. L. REv. 54, 114 (1962).
239 The limitations of the personal characteristics of the defendant as a basis for
requiring counsel are graphically demonstrated in Hudson v. North Carolina, 363
US. 697 (1960). Although reversing on other grounds, the Court did state that
Hudson was "not a case where it can be said the failure to appoint counsel for the
defendant resulted in a constitutionally unfair trial because ... of the defendant's
chronological age." Id. at 701-02. The defendant there "was only eighteen and had
been only to the sixth grade in school." Id. at 701. However, the hearing examiner
had stated that the defendant was "intelligent, well-informed, and was familiar with
and experienced in court procedure and criminal trials." Ibid. See also the dissenting
opinion, 363 U.S. 704, 705, emphasizing the defendant's familiarity with courts as a
result of having been "tried on different occasions for careless and reckless driving
while under the influence of intoxicating liquor and for assault and robbery.. "
Id. at 707.
240 363 U.S. 697 (1960). 241368 U.S. 443 (1962).
242 See Kamisar, Betts v. Brady Twenty Years Later: The Right to Counsel and
Due Process Values, 61 Micir. L. REv. 219, 280 (1962); The Supreme Court, 161
Term, supra note 238, at 115; Note, 14 W. RES. L. Ray. 370 (1963); see also Pollock,
Equal justice in Practice, 45 Mim. L. REv. 737, 741 (1961).
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of robbery. Petitioner's request for the appointment of counsel was
denied, the trial judge stating that he would "try to see that [peti-
tioner's] rights [were] protected throughout the case." 243 During
the trial, a lawyer representing one of the other defendants tend-
ered a plea of guilty to the lesser offense of petit larceny. The
guilty plea, made in the presence of the jury, was accepted by the
judge without any special comment. The trial of petitioner and his
co-defendant then proceeded to its conclusion with the jury find-
ing both defendants guilty of larceny from the person. On review
of a habeas corpus proceeding, the Court found that the particular
circumstances of the case had required the appointment of counsel.
It noted that for most of the trial, the petitioner, who had been
described by a lower court as "familiar with and experienced in
court procedure," 244 had been adequately represented through the
efforts of his co-defendant's attorney. The attorney's action in
entering his client's plea of guilty in the presence of the jury, how-
ever, had raised problems "requiring professional knowledge and
experience beyond a layman's ken."245 Although North Carolina
law had definitely recognized the potential prejudice of such an
occurrence, the "precise course to be followed by a North Caro-
lina trial court in order to cure the prejudice" was not "entirely
clear." At the least, the North Carolina decisions had established
that "when request therefor is made, it is the duty of the trial
judge to instruct the jury that a co-defendant's plea of guily is
not to be considered as evidence bearing upon the guilt of the
defendant then on trial."248 No such request had been made by
Hudson, who, as a layman, could hardly be expected to know that
he was even entitled to any "protection" against the prejudicial
effect of the co-defendant's plea, not to mention an obvious un-
awareness as to the "proper course to follow to invoke such pro-
tection." The Court concluded that Hudson therefore clearly
needed a lawyer and the failure to appoint one had resulted in a
denial of due process.24
7
243 363 U.S. at 698.
244 Id. at 701. The findings of the lower court on the post-conviction hearing
were accepted by the Supreme Court. Ibid.
245M Id. at 704-05. 246 Id. at 702-03.
247 Justices Clark and Whittaker dissented on the ground that the petitioner
had not been prejudiced by his co-defendant's guilty plea. 363 U.S. at 704,
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In Chewning, decided two years later, the indigent petitioner
was charged under the Virginia recidivist statute with having been
three times convicted and sentenced for a felony.2 8 The trial judge
refused a request for the appointment of counsel, though he did
attempt to advise the petitioner of all his rights. The petitioner
acknowledged that he had been the person mentioned in the prior
conviction, and the court sentenced him to ten years of imprison-
ment. On appeal, the Supreme Court found that the failure to
appoint counsel was a denial of due process because the complex
"nature of the charge" required the assistance of an attorney. "In
trials of this kind," the Court noted, "the labyrinth of the law is,
or may be, too intricate for the layman to master." 2'9 The issue of
"identity," for one, could have presented "difficult local law
issues." The Court also mentioned that an attorney might have
searched for defects in prior convictions that would have precluded
their admission in the multiple-offender proceeding. This could
have raised a whole host of issues including the jurisdiction of the
courts rendering the prior judgments, the validity of the prior
sentences, and the fairness of the previous trials. "Double jeopardy
and ex post facto application of the law" were other "questions
which .. .[might] well be considered by an imaginative lawyer,
who looks critically at the layer of prior convictions on which the
recidivist charge rests."2 0 The Court was careful to note that it
"intimated no opinion on whether any of the problems mentioned
would arise on petitioner's trial or, if so, whether any would have
merit."251 It "only conclud[ed]" that the "issues presented under
Virginia's statute [were] so complex," and "the potential prejudice
from the absence of counsel so great," that due process required
the appointment of counsel to represent the accused.252
248 The charge was brought in connection with the last conviction on which the
petitioner was still serving his sentence. 368 U.S. at 443-44.
249 Id. at 446. The opinion heavily relied upon Reynolds v. Cochran, 365 US. 525
(1961), which dealt with an individual's right to be represented by his own counsel
on a recidivist charge.
250 368 U.S. at 446-47. 251 Id. at 447.
252 Ibid. In a concurring opinion, Justice Harlan argued that "the bare possibility
that any of these improbable claims could have been asserted does not amount to
the 'exceptional circumstances' which, under Betts v. Brady . . .must be present
before the Fourteenth Amendment impresses on the state a duty to provide
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Taken together, the Hudson and Chewning decisions would
seem to have expanded the special circumstances concept to the
point where, as Justice Harlan put it, "the mere existence of a
serious criminal charge constituted in itself special circumstances
requiring the services of counsel ... . Even narrowly read,
Hudson required the reversal of any conviction where the record
contained a prejudicial occurrence that, under state law, might
have been prevented, or at least modified, by appointed counsel. 5 4
Moreover, a subsequent case suggested that this principle might
even carry so far as to encompass every trial where the unrepre-
sented defendant failed to use some advantageous procedure or
tactic that counsel might have employed. 215 The Che'wning deci-
sion had an even broader scope, since it was not limited to those
situations in which there was a trial. Surely research would almost
always reveal, as it did in Chew.ming, that the defendant was charged
with a crime to which an imaginative lawyer might, under some
circumstances, raise a complex legal defense beyond a layman's
grasp.25 6 Combined with Hudson, the Chewning decision would
find a denial of due process in practically every situation where
"the defendant may have made a poorer showing than he would
have if he had had counsel." It would be a rare case that failed this
test.
25 7
counsel... ." Id. at 459. Justice Harlan found that the defendant, nevertheless, had
been denied due process because he was forced to plead immediately after the
recidivist charge was made known to him. Id. at 457-58.
253 372 US. at 351.
2 5 4 See generally The Supreme Court, 1959 Term, 74 HAuv. L. REv. 81, 137 (1960);
Note, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 623, 629 (1961).
2S5 Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506 (1962). The Court here held that the peti-
tioner had been denied due process by the state's failure to appoint counsel to repre-
sent him in defending against a charge of incest with his minor daughter. The
opinion cited, inter alia, certain tactics that counsel might have employed that were
not related to any potentially prejudicial occurrence during the trial such as was
involved in Hudson. Thus, the Court noted that counsel might have filed for a
psychiatric or psychological examination of the accused. Id. at 509-10. Similarly, he
might have requested that the sentencing judge commit the petitioner to a hospital
for treatment rather than to prison. The Court also noted that the illiterate defendant
had hardly cross-examined his daughter and son, the state's primary witnesses,
although there were possible grounds for impeachment.
256 Kamisar, supra note 242, at 280; The Supreme Court, 1961 Term, supra note
238, at 115.
257 The Supreme Court, 1959 Term, supra note 254, at 137.
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The full impact of the Chewning and Hudson decisions upon
the Betts "fair trial" rule is probably best illustrated by the fact
that they would have required reversal in the Betts case itself. Cer-
tainly there are complex legal defenses that the imaginative lawyer
might raise, even to the everyday charge of robbery. As Professor
Kamisar's analysis of the Betts record has shown,2 58 an appointed
counsel in that case might well have defended on the ground that
Betts had been so intoxicated as to lack the requisite intent.25 9 With
respect to the trial, the Betts record is replete with prejudicial
occurrences that, as in Hudson, raised problems "requiring profes-
sional training beyond a layman's ken." For example, counsel rep-
resenting Betts might well have forced the exclusion of crucial
testimony on the grounds of hearsay, violation of the privilege
against self-incrimination, and patent unreliability. 20 This illustra-
tion of the impact of Chewning and Hudson on the Betts case is
reinforced by consideration of the fact situation in Gideon, that
the Court described as a "nearly indistinguishable" from Betts.
261
As in Betts, the defendant in Gideon failed to raise both defenses
and objections that counsel might have employed. 6 2 For example,
no objection was made either to the admission of opinion testimony
or to the trial judge's rulings which improperly restricted the
scope of cross-examination.68
As exemplified by their application to the Betts and Gideon fact
situations, the Chewning and Hudson decisions might well have
258 Kamisar, The Right to Counsel and the Fourteenth Amendment: A Dialogue
on "the Most Pervasive Right" of an Accused, 30 U. CGu. L. REv. 1, 42-57 (1962).
259 There was testimony at the trial that Betts appeared to have been "drinking"
Id. at 56.
260 Id. at 45, 50-51, 46-48.
261372 U.S. at 339. It should be noted that the trial record and transcript were
not before the Florida Supreme Court. Brief for the Respondent, p. 3. They were
added to the record on review before the United States Supreme Court, Brief for the
Petitioners, p. 4, but they could not properly be considered as a basis for the Court's
judgment. See Hedgbeth v. North Carolina, 334 U.S. 806 (1948).
262 Coincidentally, there was testimony in the Gideon record, like that in Betts,
that might have suggested a defense based upon defendant's intoxication. Gideon
was acquitted after a retrial in which he was represented by counsel. New York
Times, Aug. 7, 1963, p. 56, col. 1.
263 Id. at 15; see Brief for Petitioner, p. 50; Adkinson v. State, 48 Fla. 1 (1904).
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served as the basis for the argument in Gideon that, as a practical
matter, Betts had already been overruled. Moreover, here, as op-
posed to the use of a similar argument based upon Griffin and
Douglas, the abrogation of the rule was the product not of a sud-
den expansion of a previous ruling but rather of a gradual process
of erosion involving a long line of cases. Though commentators
have characterized Chewning and Hudson as "departure[s] from
prior holdings," 214 these decisions actually did little more than pro-
vide the final, logical extension of well-established principles.
The string of decisions leading up to Chewning, for example,
started with the very first right-to-counsel case decided after Betts.
In Williams v. Kaiser,65 the Court found that the defendant, who
pleaded guilty to the offense of robbery by means of a dangerous
weapon, had been constitutionally entitled to appointment of
counsel because the various degrees of that offense raised legal
questions far too technical for a layman to appreciate. Three
months later, in Rice v. Olson,266 the Court found a denial of due
process where the unrepresented defendant could have raised a
defense involving questions of federal jurisdiction that were "ob-
viously beyond the capacity of even an intelligent and educated
layman." 267 Similarly, in Moore v. Michigan,268 the Court con-
cluded that the various "technical" defenses to murder, such as
insanity and mistaken identity, had required the appointment of
counsel to represent a defendant who had pleaded guilty.26 9 The
same line of reasoning was also employed to require reversals in
264 The Supreme Court, 1961 Term, supra note 238, at 114; see also The Supreme
Court, 1939 Term, supra note 254, at 136-37; Kamisar, supra note 242, at 236; Note,
109 U. PA. L. REv. 623, 627-29 (1961).
265 323 U.S. 471 (1945). Accord, Tompkins v. Missouri, 323 U.S. 485 (1945).
Although these were capital cases, the Court emphasized the special complexity
of the legal problems as a basis for finding a denial of due process.
266 324 U.S. 786 (1945).
2671 d. at 789. The jurisdictional defense arose out of the fact that the petitioner
was an Indian and the crime was allegedly committed on an Indian reservation.
268 355 US. 155 (1957).
269 Id. at 159-61. Although primary emphasis was on this ground, the opinion also
cited the petitioner's youth and lack of education.
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Pennsylvania ex rel. Herman v. Claudy270 and McNeal v. Culver.27'
Thus, by the time the Court reached Chewning, the possible com-
plexity of even some fairly routine legal problems had been recog-
nized as requiring the appointment of counsel. Admittedly, in
most of these cases, unlike Chewning, the Court's opinions had re-
lied upon "complex" defenses that the fact situation showed to be
available to the defendants. In at least Williams, however, the
likelihood that the defendant might have taken advantage of the
difference in degrees of the crime was only slightly less speculative
than the possibility that Chewning might have attacked his prior
convictions on the grounds mentioned in the Court's opinion.
2 73
As with Chewning, the antecedents of Hudson had established
a firm foundation for the concept of "special" circumstances ad-
vanced in that case. The Court recognized fairly soon after Betts
that the failure to appoint counsel denied the defendant due process
where his trial had been marred by "a deliberate overreaching by
270 350 U.S. 116 (1956). Here the Court cited, inter alia, both the number and the
complexity of the charges against the petitioner. He was charged with thirty offenses,
eight each of burglary and forgery, two of false pretenses, and twelve of larceny.
271 365 U.S. 109 (1960). The Court here noted complex legal problems arising
out of various degrees of assault under Florida law and the differences in the intent
required for each offense. It also relied upon petitioner's lack of education and his
mental state as a separate ground for requiring appointment of counsel.
272 This was the factor emphasized in The Supreme Court, 1961 Term, supra note
238, in characterizing Che'wning as a "genuine departure from prior holdings." See
also Kamisar, supra note 186, at 279, 280.
Although some cases had spoken in terms of the "active operation" of unfairness,
see Foster v. Illinois, 332 U.S. 134 (1947), this did not require a showing of an actual
trial error as the only basis for reversal. In those cases, like Chewning, which empha-
sized the nature of the crime, it had always been sufficient that fundamental un-
fairness was apt to result from the failure to appoint counsel. See 97 U. PA. L. REv.
855, 857 (1949); cf. The Supreme Court, 1948 Term, 63 HARv. L. REV. 119, 135
(1949); BEamEy, THE RIGHT TO CoumsEL n; Amsmc.w CouRTs 163 (1955).
273 See 323 U.S. at 475-76: "If we assume that petitioner committed a crime we
cannot know the degree of prejudice which the denial of counsel caused.... only
counsel could discern from the facts whether a plea of not guilty to the offense
charged or a plea of guilty to a lesser offense would be appropriate" The opinion
gave no indication of the facts upon which counsel might make such a determination.
In Moore v. Michigan, 355 US. 155 (1957), the only indication that the defendant
might have relied upon the defense of mistaken identity was the fact "that the evi-
dence pointing to him as perpetrator of the crime was entirely circumstantial." Id,
at 160.
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Court or prosecutor" that an attorney might have prevented. 74
In Gibbs v. Burke2 75 this approach was extended to a situation
involving only normal trial errors, such as the admission of hearsay
evidence, the exclusion of relevant evidence, and the improper
designation of a prosecution witness as defendant's witness. Casb
v. Culver270 went even further in holding that the state's mere
introduction of accomplice testimony created problems "beyond
a layman's ken" that required the appointment of counsel. Al-
though the Cash opinion did note that there had been a "serious
question" as to the admissibility of portions of the accomplice's
testimony, much of its emphasis was upon missed opportunities
rather than actual trial errors. The Court particularly stressed the
defendant's failure to minimize the effect of the accomplice's tes-
timony by such tactics as requesting a jury instruction cautioning
against reliance on such testimony, cross-examining the accomplice
as to whether he testified under an "agreement for leniency," and
using the witness' testimony at a previous trial as a basis for im-
peachment. 277 Thus, from Cash, the step to Hudson was not a very
large one. Of course, Cash involved more omissions by the de-
fendant that were clearly prejudicial, but its basic thesis seemed
applicable so long as there were any occurrences at trial on which
a lawyer's advice might have proved helpful.279 Also, while the
274 Hudson v. North Carolina, 363 US. 697, 701-02 (1960). See Townsend v.
Burke, 334 U.S. 736 (1948); DeMeerleer v. Michigan, 329 U.S. 633 (1947) (based
in part on this ground); see also Williams v. Kaiser, 323 U.S. 471, 476 (1945)
(dictum); Marino v. Ragen, 332 U.S. 561 (1947).
275 337 U.S. 773 (1949); see also Palmer v. Ashe, 342 U.S. 134 (1951).
276 358 U.S. 633 (1959).
277 Id. at 637-38. While the Court also mentioned petitioner's youth and inexpe-
rience, the decision expressly was grounded on the "complexity of the proceedings."
]bid.
2 78 See also McNeal v. Culver, 365 US. 109 (1961).
270 Some commentators had suggested that the Court found a denial of due process
only when a particular trial error was thought to be especially prejudicial. See, e.g.,
Fellman, The Federal Right to Counsel in State Courts, 31 NEB. L. Rnv. 15, 26
(1951); The Supreme Court, 1948 Term, supra note 272, at 135. The Court, how-
ever, had never acknowledged the commission of an error in a case where a
denial of due process was not found, and the language in various opinions, par-
ticularly in the later cases, seemed to reject any such analysis. See cases cited
notes 283, infra, 268-71 supra.
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legal problem that arose in Hudson, perhaps unlike those in Cash,
would not have been assessable before the trial began,28 the same
had been true in cases like Gibbs v. Burke.
As this history of the "special circumstances" cases shows, the
Court had consistently whittled away at the Betts rule until with
Chewning and Hudson it was almost completely eroded. Ad-
mittedly, though this development started almost immediately after
Betts, not every case during the twenty-two-year period required
the appointment of counsel. Most of the cases that seemingly "re-
inforced" the Betts rule, however, actually were based on inde-
pendent grounds such as the waiver of counsel.81 In others, like
Bute v. Illinois,28 2 the Court was restricted by the limited scope of
the common-law record. 283 So despite occasional setbacks, all of
which occurred within six years after Betts, the over-all view of
the counsel cases represents a fairly steady stream of development
over twenty-two years in which eighteen different Justices had
participated, including most of those who joined Justice Roberts
in Betts. The eventual outcome of this progression had been recog-
nized even before Hudson and Chewning.8 4 In fact, it was so clear
by the time of Che'wning that counsel there was able to argue that,
in effect, Betts had already been overruled.288 Surely after the
Chewning decision, the Court in Gideon could well have main-
tained that Betts indeed had been overruled sub silentio by the
subsequent course of decisions, so that all that remained to be done
was to publish its obituary-a task unfortunately necessitated by
280See Note, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 623, 627-28 (1961), distinguishing Hudson on
this point.
281 See, e.g., Quicksal v. Michigan, 339 U.S. 660 (1950) (waiver); Carter v. Illi-
nois, 329 U.S. 173 (1946) (waiver); Gayes v. New York, 332 U.S. 145 (1947)
(issue of right to counsel not properly open to attack); see also Foster v. Illinois,
332 U.S. 134 (1947) (seeming to rely at least in part on waiver).
282 333 U.S. 640 (1948).
283See id. at 668, 673-74. In Gryger v. Burke, 334 U.S. 728 (1948), another case
in which the Court sustained the conviction, the Court stressed that the only issue
open under the recidivist charge against the defendant was whether he was in fact
the person named in the prior convictions. Also, the Court refused to accept the
contention advanced in the dissent that the trial judge had sentenced the defend-
ant on the basis of an erroneous assumption.
284 See, e.g., Note, 26 TEXAs. L. Rnv. 665 (1948); Note, 1 U. FLA. L. Ray. 450
(1948).
285 Brief for the Petitioner, pp. 35-37.
[1963
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the refusal of some state courts, like the Florida court in Gideon,
to recognize the true state of the law.
28 6
B. BETTS AND THE LESSONS OF EXPERIENCE
The Court in Gideon could also have argued that the rejection
of the Betts rule was supported by knowledge derived from ex-
perience in applying that rule, which, had it been available orig-
inally, would have presented the Betts case in an entirely different
light. In fact, the Court might even have suggested that, consider-
ing the limited experience of the Betts Court in this area, the
fundamental approach it adopted in Betts was entirely proper,
though misapplied to the particular facts of that case. While the
broad reach of plaintiff's argument and the dissenting opinion may
have led the majority to pass over the Betts record too casually,28 7
the basic approach of a case-by-case analysis of the need for ap-
pointment of counsel arguably was well suited to the context of
the problem at that time.288 The Court in Betts lacked the sense of
sureness needed to adopt a firm rule that defendants in state courts
had to be represented by counsel in order to insure the fair hearing
guaranteed by the Due Process Clause.28 9 There were various mat-
ters that had to be determined before such a position could be
taken: e.g., what were the various offenses that might be involved,
what types of procedures did the states employ when the defendant
represented himself, and how did state judges conduct trials in
such cases?290 Lacking the general background that comes with
280 See 372 U.S. 349, 351 (Harlan, J, concurring); see also Kamisar, supra note
242, at 281.
287 Neither counsel for Betts nor the dissenting opinion attempted to cite any
incidents where Betts might have been prejudiced by the absence of counsel. See
Brief for the Petitioner, pp. 16-24; 316 U.S. at 474-80; see also Kamisar, supra note
258, at 52.
288 Other cases decided at the time also emphasized this approach. See Palko v.
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937); Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934);
see also Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947).
289 The emphasis here must, of course, be on the diverse nature of state courts,
since the Court had already been convinced that this was the case in federal
courts. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462-63 (1938).
290The states have sometimes maintained that the informality of such trials
gives the defendant great latitude in presenting defenses, examining witnesses, etc.
See, e.g., Brief for the States of Alabama and North Carolina as amicus curiae in
Gideon v. Wainwrigbt at pp. 9-10. See also 316 U.S. at 472.
2113
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consistent review of decisions in a particular area,20' the Court had
not fully developed what Llewellyn described as an appreciation
of the total "situation-pattern" with all its "detailed variants. 20 2
Under these circumstances, the formulation of a narrow rule, a
case-by-case approach, was consistent with the normal process of
appellate decision-making.03 It was particularly understandable
when one considers that the use of the Due Process Clause as an
effective device for the regulation of the state criminal process was
then still a fairly recent innovation,29 and that Judge Bond, a high-
ly respected jurist, had observed that in his state "there [were] fair
trials without counsel employed for the prisoners."291 5
The experience of twenty-two years, however, had provided a
basis for re-examining the crucial assumptions upon which Betts
was based. For one thing, the presumption that a lawyerless de-
fendant would usually, or even frequently be able to defend him-
self adequately had been largely disproved by the constant expan-
sion of the special circumstances concept. Certainly, the routine
nature of many of the cases in which "special" circumstances were
found suggests that the instances in which an indigent layman
could appreciate all his legal defenses and rights are, to say the
291 See Allen, supra note 205, at 193-95, discussing the Court's rather limited
consideration of the criminal process in the states prior to Powell. While the
Court had considered some cases involving state criminal procedure (including
two right-to-counsel cases) during the period between Betts and Powell, it still
lacked the familiarity with the practices and problems in this area that has come
with the constantly expanding scope of due process. See note 294 infra.
2 9 2 LLEwELLYN, Tan CoMMoN LAW TRaDrroN 268-70, 426-27 (1960).
293 Id. at 427-29.
294 See generally Allen, supra note 205. Some of the most important restrictions
upon the states had not yet been considered by the Court. See, e.g., Wolf v.
Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949). In other areas where initial action had already been
undertaken, the Court had considered only the relatively "easy" cases where the
abusive aspects of the state's action were most glaringly presented. Compare, e.g.,
Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940), with Turner v. Pennsylvania, 338 U.S.
62 (1949), or Colombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1961); Mooney v. Hollohan,
294 U.S. 103 (1935), with Alcorta v. Texas, 355 U.S. 28 (1957).
295 316 U.S. at 472 n.31. See also FREUND, TaE SuPamEt CoURT oF THE UIaE
STATES 146 (1961), where the author speculates as to "whether the decision in
Betts v. Brady ... would have been the same had the opinion of the court below
been written by someone less highly esteemed than Chief Judge Bond of Mary-
land, who is referred to by name in Mr. Justice Roberts's opinion no fewer than
fifteen times." The Court had taken special note of Judge Bond's scholarship even
before Betts. See O'Malley v. Woodrough, 307 U.S. 277, 281 n.8 (1939).
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least, exceedingly rare29 8--probably too rare in fact even to bother
considering in framing a constitutional rule governing appointment
of counsel.
2 7
Furthermore, even if such instances were far more common,
experience in applying the Betts rule had shown the frequent im-
possibility of determining which defendants would be deprived
of a fair hearing without a lawyer. As cases like Hudson illustrate,
the legal difficulties that defendant will face are frequently un-
assessable at the start of the proceedings. The judge can hardly be
expected to predict accurately the course of the trial or the in-
digent's response to the problems that might arise. Betts, of course,
assumed that the trial judge would help the defendant over any
such unexpected hurdles,298 but, as Hudson again exemplifies, even
where the trial judge is making every effort to do this,2 99 he can-
not, consistent with his judicial function, truly place himself in the
position of defendant's advocate.300 Also, as cases like Chevwning
show, even if problems concerning the trial are avoided because the
defendant pleads guilty, one can never be sure that a lawyer's in-
vestigation and analysis might not have produced a defense, un-
known to the defendant, that could have resulted in a different
plea.30
1
290 Even the most severe critics of the Betts rule have recognized that there
may be instances in which the absence of counsel did not deprive the defendant
of a fair hearing. See, e.g., Kamisar, supra note 258, at 42. But see Schilke, supra
note 236, at 342.
207 Cf. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
298 See 316 U.S. at 472 (referring particularly to a judge in non-jury trial); see
also Gibbs v. Burke, 337 U.S. 773, 781 (1949). It should be noted that Betts did not
reinstate Coke's argument, rejected in Powell, that the judge could perform all of
the functions of counsel. See 287 U.S. at 61. The Betts opinion apparently accepted
the same assumption that was made in Powell that the judge would "see to it that
in the proceedings before the Court the accused shall be dealt with fairly and
justly," presumably by advising him of all of his rights. Compare Betts, 316 U.S.
at 472, and Gibbs, 337 U.S. at 781, ,with Powell, 287 U.S. at 61.
299 See 363 U.S. at 698, 700-01; cf. Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506 (1962).
300 Thus, in Hudson, the judge can hardly inform the defendant of a jury in-
struction that was not required, but might be to his advantage. See also Pollock,
Equal Justice in Practice, 45 MNN. L. REv. 737, 741-42 (1961).
301 This defect in the Betts rule is reinforced by the paradox that the more the
accused needs counsel, the less likely it is that he will be capable of proving this
need to the court. BEvEY, THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN AAfamcAN CouRTs 185 (1955).
211]
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Finally, even if a judge following the Betts rule could recognize
all the instances in which counsel were needed, the difficulties re-
vealed in the administration of the rule might outweigh any advan-
tages it would have over a flat requirement that counsel be ap-
pointed. The necessary vagueness of the special circumstances
concept left the Betts rule open to extreme manipulation by the
lower courts. In some states, the courts had twisted the rule to the
point where the right to appointed counsel was almost non-existent
no matter what the nature of the case.302 And while the time-con-
suming process of constant review of counsel cases by the Court
might have corrected these tendencies,303 experience had revealed
that the very nature of Betts rule made it inevitable that lower
court application would always be uncertain and uneven.30 4
On the other side, the lessons of experience had revealed the
myth in what the Court had considered a major advantage of the
Betts rule-that it was more consistent with the "obligations of fed-
eralism" than an absolute requirement of counsel, since it kept to a
302 See, e.g., Butler v. Culver, 111 So. 2d. 35 (Fla. 1959); Commonwealth ex rel.
Simon v. Maroney, 405 Pa. 562 (1961); Shaffer v. Warden, 211 Md. 635 (1956).
All the post-Betts state cases listed in the state reports are collected in the brief
amicus of the American Civil Liberties Union in Gideon at pp. 50-51. They show,
for example, that the Florida court has found a denial of due process in only one
of fourteen reported cases involving the refusal to appoint counsel. (One other
was remanded for a hearing.) Maryland reversed three out of thirty-nine cases,
two out of the three being cases reviewed on direct appeal. The ratio for cases
decided since 1949 are about the same, even though the Supreme Court has re-
versed over a dozen state cases during that period without one affirmance.
303 Full appreciation of the Betts rule seemed to improve in certain states fol-
lowing Supreme Court reversals of their state court decisions finding no need for
counsel. See, e.g., People v. Whitsitt, 359 Mich. 656 (1960); People v. Coates, 347
Mich. 626 (1957).
304 See generally Allen, The Supreme Court, Federalism, and State Criminal
Justice. 8 DE PAUL L. REv. 213, 228-29 (1959). For one thing, the lower court
results often will vary, according to the willingness of the trial judge to undertake
the heavy burden placed upon him both in advising defendants of their rights and
in attempting to learn enough about defendant's view of the facts so as to know
whether any "complex" defenses might be considered by a lawyer. The scope of
this task is illustrated by the lengthy list of inquiries that one judge has suggested
as absolutely necessary to be able properly to apply the Betts rule. See Sloan, The
Jail House Lawyer versus Court and Counsel: Some Ideas for Self-Protection, 1
WAsHeuaN LJ. 517, 524, 526 (1962). Past cases indicate that many state judges
would be reluctant to go so far as Justice Sloan suggests.
[1963
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minimum the federal restriction upon the "historic power of the
states to prescribe their own local court procedures."305 Experience
with the Betts rule had shown that it probably engendered as
much friction between federal and state courts as an absolute re-
quirement would have produced. Betts was in large part respon-
sible for proliferation of the vexing habeas corpus cases in federal
courts.30 Probably more state prisoners were released by federal
courts for the failure of the state to appoint counsel than on any
other ground.30 7 In other cases, reversals were based on obvious
errors that presumably would have been prevented had defendant
been represented by counsel.308 Moreover, the reaction to these
reversals of state convictions was probably intensified by the type
of analysis the federal courts were required to make under Betts.
The special circumstances concept, particularly in the light of
cases like Hudson and Cash, required the reviewing court to make
an extensive examination of state law in order to find errors or un-
considered issues that showed the need for counsel. State court
judges were told not only that they had failed to give "adequate
judicial guidance or protection" to the defendant,30 9 but that their
error had been in the misapplication of their own state law.310 In
the light of this experience, a strong argument could be made that
the obligations of federalism would be more adequately served by
305 Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640, 668, 652-54 (1948); see also Foster v. Illinois
332 US. 134, 136-38 (1947); Carter v. Illinois, 329 U.S. 173, 175 (1946).
S0 See Reitz, Federal Habeas Corpus: Post-Conviction Remedy for State Pris-
oners, 108 U PA. L. REv. 461,465,483-85 (1960); Note, 15 U. Cm. L. REv. 107, 119-20
(1947); see also the Brief for the American Civil Liberties Union in Gideon v.
Wainwright, p. 29.
307 See Reitz, supra note 306, at 483.
3 0
8 See Brief for the State of Oregon as amicus curiae in Gideon v. Wainwright,
pp. 4-6, citing statistics on the cases reversed under the Oregon Post Conviction
Act.
309 Gibbs v. Burke, 337 U.S. 773, 781 (1949).
310 See, e.g., McNeal v. Culver, 365 U.S. 109, 116 (1961), where the Court found
both that the admission of certain evidence had been a "patent violation" of state
law and that defendant had been convicted of a crime that probably did not exist
under state law. See also Cash v. Culver, 358 U.S. 633 (1959); Gibbs v. Burke,
supra note 309. In Hudson v. North Carolina, 363 U.S. 697, 705 (1960), the Court
sua sponte found a problem that the trial court, the post-conviction court, and
counsel on both sides had overlooked.
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a simple, unqualified requirement for the appointment of counsel
than the inevitable reversals (and subsequent retrials) under the
special circumstances doctrine of Betts.3 11 Thus, the Court in
Gideon could have suggested, as it did in another recent case, that
experience under the overruled case had shown that at least one of
the earlier Court's basic objectives could best be achieved through
reversal of its original decision.312
C. BETTS AND CHANGING CONDITIONS
There remains for consideration the possibility of employing in
Gideon the argument that "changed conditions" had "completely
sapped [Betts] of [its] authority. 3 13 Based as it was on due process,
"the least frozen concept of our law-the least confined to history
and the most absorptive of powerful standards of a progressive
society,"3 14 the Betts decision naturally lends itself to the rationale
of the changed conditions. This is particularly true in the light of
the Court's opinion. Mr. Justice Roberts relied heavily upon "the
common understanding of those who have lived under the Anglo-
American system of law" to sustain the Court's conclusion that
appointment of counsel was not invariably essential to a fair trial
and therefore was not "fundamental. 31 5 This consensus of Anglo-
American opinion was found in the "constitutional and statutory
provisions subsisting in the colonies and the states prior to the
[adoption] of the Bill of Rights... and in the constitutional, legis-
lative, and judicial history of the states to the present date." 310, Such
"material demonstrates," said Justice Roberts, "that, in the great
majority of the States, it has been the considered judgment of the
people, their representatives and their courts that appointment of
counsel is not a fundamental right, essential to a fair trial. On the
contrary, the matter has generally been deemed one of legislative
policy.' '317
311 Indeed, the practical difficulties of relitigating years after the crime occurred
will often make a retrial unlikely.
312 Cf. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 437-38 (1963); Kamisar, supra note 251, at 36.
313 Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Labor Board, 313 U.S. 177, 187 (1941).
314 Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 20-21 (1956) (concurring opinion).
315 316 U.S. at 464. 316 Id. at 465.
317 Id. at 471. The same conclusion was reached, after a similar analysis of both
state and pre-1938 federal practices, in Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640, 660-68 (1948).
[1963
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Obviously, one basis for the Court's conclusion-the original
colonial and state provisions-has not and will not change. It might
be urged, nevertheless, that developments within the pattern of cur-
rent state practices over the past twenty-two years had reached the
point where Justice Roberts' judgment as to the "common under-
standing" of the community was no longer accurate. When Betts
was decided, thirty-one states had "some clear legal requirement or
an established practice that indigent defendants in serious non-capi-
tal... cases be... provided with counsel." 318 Today, thirty-eight
states have legal provisions requiring the appointment of counsel in
such cases,3 19 and seven more almost invariably follow that pro-
cedure as a matter of practice.3 20 There also have been increased
indications that these state requirements are viewed as "funda-
mental" laws rather than matters of "legislative policy" subject to
modification "from time to time as [the legislature] deemed neces-
sary."321 Since Betts, at least seven additional states, making ten in
all, have held that a statutory requirement merely restated a consti-
tutional guarantee of the defendant's right to appointed counsel.
322
318316 U.S. at 477 n2 (dissenting opinion). The appendix to Justice Black's
dissent listed thirty-five states in this category. But four states were "misclassified."
See Kamisar, supra note 258, at 17 n.74. Of the remaining thirty-one states, all
required counsel in at least every felony case except New Hampshire, which fur-
nishes counsel only where the defendant is charged with an offense punishable
by at least three years' imprisonment.
31 0 Kamisar, supra note 258, at 17-18. One of the new additions to this group,
however, Maryland, only provides counsel in cases where the maximum sentence
is at least five years' imprisonment.
320 Kamisar, supra note 258, at 18-20.
321 See Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 471 (1942).
322 Justice Roberts' opinion cited three state courts that had held that appoint-
ment of counsel was constitutionally required. Id. at 469 (listing Georgia, Ken-
tucky, and Wisconsin). See also Therman v. State 205 Ark. 376, (1943); People v.
Mattson, 51 Cal. 2d 777, (1959); State ex rel. Grecco v. Allen Circuit Court, 238
Ind. 571 (1958); Wiley v. Hudspeth, 162 Kan. 516 (1947); State v. Johnson, 63
NJ. Super 16 (1960); State v. Garcia, 47 N. Mex. 319 (1943) (dictum); In re
Motz, 100 Ohio App. 296 (1955); Hunter v. State, 288 P. 2d 425 (Okla. Cr. 1955);
cf. People v. Waterman, 9 N.Y. 2d 561 (1961). There are many states, however,
that have held that appointment of counsel is not constitutionally required. See
Brief for the American Civil Liberties Union in Gideon, pp. 51-55. See, e.g.,
Kelley v. People, 206 P. 2d 337 (Colo. 1949); Sneed v. Mayo, 66 So. 2d 865 (Fla.
1953); Marvin v. Warden, 212 Md. 634 (1957); People v. Haddad, 306 Mich. 561
(1943); State v. Delaney, 332 P. 2d 71 (Ore. 1958),
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Moreover, with the passage of an additional twenty-two years,
many of these statutory provisions have become so firmly embed-
ded in a state's law that they have practically achieved the "sanc-
tity" of a constitutional provision.
8 23
While similar developments in state practices have been cited in
past opinions, 824 the nature and degree of these changes since Betts
do not provide a strong case for arguing that contemporary views
on appointment of counsel have so changed in twenty-two years
that they now represent a "permanent and pervasive feeling"
"rooted in our traditions and conscience."3' 25 This is not to suggest,
however, that such changes have no bearing on the argument for
overruling Betts. The positions taken in statutes, court decisions,
and state constitutions over the years may be valid criteria for
determining whether a particular value or principle is "fundamen-
tal" to our society, but that was not the issue before the Court in
Betts. Justice Roberts' analysis began with the acceptance of the
fundamental principle of a fair hearing, which requires inter alia
a process insuring the reliability of the final determination of
323 The trend toward the mandatory appointment of counsel has been primarily
a post-Civil War development, so most of the state provisions will be less than a
century old. Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640, 665 (1948). But a provision in existence
for even half that period might be considered almost on a par with state consti-
tutions, which do not usually last much longer than that without major modifica-
tions. This is particularly true in those states where constitutional amendments are
fairly easily adopted. See, e.g., Mn-. CoNsT., art. 14, § 1 (1898).
It should also be noted that the passage of time has lessened the practical conse-
quences of applying the Gideon decision retrospectively. Those states that had
only recently adopted appointment provisions in 1942 are unlikely to have many
prisoners in jail today, as they would have had then, who will be entitled to release
on the basis of Gideon. The Court had previously suggested that its rejection of
an absolute requirement of appointment of counsel was reinforced by the fact that
"such an abrupt innovation ... would furnish opportunities hitherto uncontem-
plated for opening wide the prison doors of the land:' Foster v. Illinois, 332 U.S.
134, 139 (1947).
324 See Kadish, Methodology and Criteria in Due Process Adfudication-A Survey
and Criticism, 66 YALE LJ. 319, 331-32 (1959) (collecting cases); cf. Elkins v.
United States, 364 US. 206 (1960). As Professor Kadish notes, the "use of a com-
monly followed state practice as evidence that a contrary practice violates due
process has found favor primarily in dissenting opinions"
32 5 Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 US. 9, 16 (1950) (dissenting opinion); Snyder v.
Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934); see also The Supreme Court, 1961 Term,
supra note 256, at 114,
E1963
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guilt3 26 The issue in Betts was whether a lawyer was needed to
achieve that objective, i.e., whether the innocent but lawyerless de-
fendant may be convicted "because he does not know how to
establish his innocence."327 This is largely a question of fact, not of
values, to which state practices serve as no more than evidence of
how others have approached this same problem. In this respect, the
increase in the number of states affording counsel to indigents
might well have been used to support the Gideon result in the same
manner that the Mapp opinion employed the states' shift to the ex-
clusionary rule.82 8
IV. CONCLUSION
It seems fair to say that the Court in Gideon could easily
have relied upon at least two of those rationales that have tradi-
tionally been employed in overruling opinions. Not only were
arguments based upon the "lessons of experience" and the require-
ments of later precedent relevant and persuasive, but they had been
urged upon the Court both by petitioner's brief and by the separate
opinions of Justices Douglas and Black in two recent cases.
3 29
Moreover, the application of these "techniques" of overruling was
particularly appropriate under the circumstances surrounding the
Gideon decision. During a Term in which so many of the Court's
rulings had been attributed to recent changes in personnel,330 it
would have been especially advantageous to emphasize those fac-
tors other than the different outlook of the present Court that con-
tributed to the rejection of a renowned decison of its predecessor.
It was, perhaps, inevitable, no matter what the Court wrote, that
the Time article on Gideon would observe that the "flow of U.S.
law.., often reverses its course according to the personalities and
828 See Kadish, supra note 324, at 346.
827Powell v. Alabama, 287 US. 45, 69 (1932); see Kadish, supra note 324, at
333-34.
828 367 U.S. at 651-53; see text at note 54 supra.
320 See Petitioner's Brief, pp. 20-33, 36-43, 50-53; McNeal v. Culver, 365 U.S.
109, 117-22 (1961) (Douglas, J., concurring); Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506,
517-20 (1962) (Black, J., concurring).
830 See, e.g., Lewis, Focus on High Court, New York Times, April 7, 1963, S 4,
p. 13, col. 1; U.S. News and World Report 19 (March 4, 1963).
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politics of reigning justices," and, with obvious innuendo, would
pose the question "what do all those earlier decisions mean?"
331
Still, and perhaps particularly for that reason, the Court might have
framed an opinion that provided its supporters with a foundation
for answering that question consistent with the accepted image of
judicial review.
One further thought might be added. In keeping with Justice
Frankfurter's admonition that a true evaluation of an opinion must
take into account the "considerations that lead a court to write an
opinion one way rather than another," 332 the question should be
asked why the Gideon opinion followed the path that it did. Many
speculations might be offered, but the thesis that seems the most
convincing, though hardly a complete explanation, is simply that
the failure of the Gideon opinion to utilize the usual overruling
rationale is attributable primarily to its authorship by Justice Black.
As the writer of the dissent in Betts, Justice Black would have a
natural interest in vindicating his original opinion (which might
well be reflected in Gideon's emphasis upon the argument that
Betts represented "an abrupt break with its own well-considered
precedents"). But to explain the Gideon opinion solely or even
primarily in terms of this interest hardly does justice to the depth
of the Justice's views. One of the cornerstones of Justice Black's
constitutional philosophy 34 has been his belief, most clearly articu-
lated in his Adamson dissent,333 that the Fourteenth Amendment
"incorporates" all of the guarantees of the Bill of Rights. Of
331 These comments were also directed at Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963), see
note 1 supra, and Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963) (holding invalid the Georgia
County Unit system as applied to statewide elections), two cases decided on the
same day as Gideon that were also classified as overruling decisions. The article
also noted, as might be expected, that Justice Black had dissented in Betts while all
of the members of the majority in that case were either deceased or retired.
332 Pn.mns, FLrix FRANKuRTF REMrmscES 296 (1960).
333 See text at notes 136-83. Although Justices who dissented in the original case
have frequently joined subsequent overruling opinions, they have only infrequently
been assigned the Court's opinion in the overruling case. See Blaustein & Field,
"Overruling" Opinions in the Supreme Court, 57 MIcH. L. REv. 151, 184-94 (1958).
334 See generally, Reich, Mr. justice Black and the Living Constitution, 76 HxAv.
L. REv. 673 (1963); Cabn, Justice Black and the First Amendment "Absolutes": A
Public Interview, 37 N.Y.U.L. REv. 549, 559 (1962).
335 Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68, 71-72 (1947).
[1963
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course, his opinion for the Court in Gideon did accept the prevail-
ing "fundamental rights" interpretation of the Fourteenth Amend-
ments,36 but that "acceptance" was carefully based only on the
force of prior precedent and even then seemingly was limited to a
view of the "fundamental rights" test that requires "complete ab-
sorption" of each such right.3 37 Moreover, the Court's opinion was
336 372 U.S. at 342: 'Ve accept Betts v. Brady's assumption, based as it was on
our prior cases, that a provision of the Bill of Rights which is 'fundamental and
essential to a fair trial' is made obligatory upon the States by the Fourteenth
Amendment." (Emphasis added.) Justice Black ordinarily has been most willing to
disregard precedents in constitutional cases. See Reich, supra note 334, at 681; Green
v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 193 (1958) (dissenting opinion). But cf. United States
v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 66 (1950) (dissenting opinion).
337 Under the traditional view of the "fundamental rights" approach, the Four-
teenth Amendment may encompass only a portion of a right protected against the
federal government under one of the first eight Amendments. See Palko v. Con-
necticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937); Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 66 (1947) (con-
curring opinion). See also Henkin, Some Reflections on Current Constitutional
Controversy, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 637, 641 (1961).
Justice Brennan recently has advanced the view that individual rights within the
Bill of Rights that are ranked as fundamental must be "absorbed" by the Fourteenth
Amendment "in toto," i.e., these individual rights must have the same scope in their
application to the states as they do to the federal government. See Ohio ex rel. Eaton
v. Price, 364 U.S. 263 (1960) (dissent from the judgment of an equally divided
Court); Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117, 154 (1961) (dissenting opinion). Justice
Black apparently has accepted this view as the best alternative to the total "incorpo-
ration" position of Adamson. See Ohio ex rel. Eaton v. Price, supra. There are
various indications that the Gideon opinion was written with this view in mind.
First, the opinion consistently refers to the "Sixth Amendment right to counsel"
that is made applicable to the states. See, e.g., 372 U.S. at 340, 342. In the same vein,
the opinion notes that "those guarantees of the Bill of Rights which are fundamental
safeguards of liberty immune from federal abridgment are equally protected against
state invasion by the Due Process Clause...." Sd. at 341. (Emphasis added.)
It is also interesting to note that the opinion describes Palko simply as a case that
refused to make the "double jeopardy provision of the Fifth Amendment' obliga-
tory in the states. There is no reference to Justice Cardozo's careful restriction of
the Palko opinion to the particular aspect of double jeopardy involved there, includ-
ing a suggestion that other aspects of double jeopardy may apply to the states via
the Fourteenth Amendment. See 302 U.S. at 328. It was apparently these features
of the Gideon opinion that made Justice Harlan feel it necessary to express
his "understanding" that the Court was not embracing the concept that the
Fourteenth Amendment "incorporates" the Sixth Amendment as such. See 372
U.S. at 352. Justice Douglas argued in reply that total incorporation of each
federal guarantee was clearly the present constitutional standard. Id. at 346. Even
if Justice Douglas' views on this score are not accepted by a majority, certainly
the Gideon opinion is consistent with the later adoption of this concept of the
2113
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accompanied by a separate statement of Justice Black's co-dissenter
in Adamson, Justice Douglas, that the Gideon decision "happily"
would not prevent the Court from adopting the "total incorpora-
tion" view sometime in the future.338 In the light of this position,
Justice Black certainly could not be expected to adopt any ra-
tionale that even hinted at the original validity of Betts, a decision
that exemplifies for him all the evils of the "fundamental rights"
approach.3 39 Neither could he adopt any argument, such as the
gradual erosion of Betts under the "special circumstances" cases,
that might seemingly accept the basic premise of that approach. In
any event, all such arguments are superfluous to one who believes
that the Fourteenth Amendment automatically includes the right
to appointment of counsel because the same guarantee is contained
in the Sixth Amendment.
The contents of the Gideon opinion thus were almost preor-
dained by the deeply set views of its author. With all due respect to
Justice Black, one might suggest that so long as his philosophy is
not accepted by a majority, the interests of the Court would have
been better served if the Court's opinion had been written by a
Justice whose views permitted him to employ the traditional arts
of overruling.3 40
Fourteenth Amendment. At the least, the opinion indicates that so far as the right
to counsel is concerned, the standards under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments will be the same. Cf. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963), where the Court
took this same approach in the more complex area of search and seizure.
838 372 U.S. at 346; see note 336 supra.
339 See, e.g., his comments upon Betts in the following separate opinions: Inter-
national Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 326 (1945); Adamson v. California,
332 U.S. 46, 83, 84, 90 (1947).
340 Cf. Kauper, Prayer, Public Schools and the Supreme Court, 61 Micr. L. Ray.
1031 (1963).
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